minor update of flood control

enabled more secure prompting for the highly critical "bipmkpw" util

src/bipmkpw.c

@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 #include "config.h"
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
 #include "util.h"
 #include "md5.h"
 
@@ -8,27 +13,59 @@ int conf_log_level;
 FILE *conf_global_log_file;
 int conf_log;
 
-int main(int argc, char **argv)
+void readpass(char *buffer, int buflen)
+{
+	int ttyfd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+	if (ttyfd == -1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open tty: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	
+	struct termios tt, ttback;
+	memset(&ttback, 0, sizeof(ttback));
+	if (tcgetattr(ttyfd, &ttback) < 0) {
+		printf("tcgetattr failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	
+	memcpy(&tt, &ttback, sizeof(ttback));
+	tt.c_lflag &= ~(ICANON|ECHO);
+	if (tcsetattr(ttyfd, TCSANOW, &tt) < 0) {
+		printf("tcsetattr failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	
+	write(ttyfd, "Password: ", 10);
+	
+	int idx = 0;
+	while (idx < buflen) {
+		read(ttyfd, buffer+idx, 1);
+		if (buffer[idx] == '\n') {
+			buffer[idx] = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+		idx++;
+	}
+	
+	write(ttyfd, "\n", 1);
+	
+	tcsetattr(ttyfd, TCSANOW, &ttback);
+	close(ttyfd);
+}
+
+int main(int argc __attribute__((unused)), char **argv __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	int i;
-	char *ret;
+	static char str[256];
-	char str[256];
 	unsigned char *md5;
 	unsigned int seed;
 
-	srand(time(NULL));
+	readpass(str, 256);
-	printf("Enter password:\n");
-	ret = fgets(str, 256, stdin);
-	srand(time(NULL));
-	if (!ret)
-		return 1;
-	for (i = 0; i < 256 && str[i] != '\n'; i++)
-		;
-	if (i >= 256)
-		return 2;
-	str[i] = 0;
 
+	// the time used to type the pass is entropy
+	srand(time(NULL));
 	seed = rand();
+	
 	md5 = chash_double(str, seed);
         for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
 		printf("%02x", md5[i]);

src/connection.c

@@ -682,12 +682,12 @@ int cn_want_write(connection_t *cn)
 				cn->token = 1;
 				cn->lasttoken = now;
 			} else if (now > cn->lasttoken + TOKEN_INTERVAL) {
-				/* there may be an overflow here
-				 * but the impact is insignificant */
 				cn->token += (now - cn->lasttoken) /
 					TOKEN_INTERVAL;
 				if (cn->token > TOKEN_MAX)
 					cn->token = TOKEN_MAX;
+				if (!cn->token)
+					cn->token = 1;
 				cn->lasttoken = now;
 			}
 		} else