stupidgcm: stupidChacha20poly1305: normalize panic messages

This commit is contained in:
Jakob Unterwurzacher 2021-09-02 10:50:45 +02:00
parent 5df7ee815d
commit 591a56e7ae
2 changed files with 3 additions and 7 deletions

View File

@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Overhead() int {
// Seal encrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst"
func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) []byte {
if g.wiped {
panic("BUG: tried to use wiped stupidChacha20poly1305")
panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key")
}
if len(iv) != g.NonceSize() {
log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported, you passed %d bytes", g.NonceSize(), len(iv))
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) []byte {
// Open decrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst"
func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Open(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if g.wiped {
panic("BUG: tried to use wiped stupidChacha20poly1305")
panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key")
}
if len(iv) != g.NonceSize() {
log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported", g.NonceSize())
@ -216,8 +216,7 @@ func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Open(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) ([]byte, err
return append(dst, buf...), nil
}
// Wipe tries to wipe the AES key from memory by overwriting it with zeros
// and setting the reference to nil.
// Wipe tries to wipe the key from memory by overwriting it with zeros.
//
// This is not bulletproof due to possible GC copies, but
// still raises the bar for extracting the key.

View File

@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
// +build !without_openssl
// We compare against Go's built-in GCM implementation. Since stupidgcm only
// supports 128-bit IVs and Go only supports that from 1.5 onward, we cannot
// run these tests on older Go versions.
package stupidgcm
import (