syscallcompat: add OpenNofollow helper
OpenNofollow = symlink-race-safe Open Prepares fixing https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/165
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49
internal/syscallcompat/open_nofollow.go
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49
internal/syscallcompat/open_nofollow.go
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
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package syscallcompat
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import (
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"syscall"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/tlog"
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)
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// OpenNofollow opens the file/dir at "relPath" in a way that is secure against
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// symlink attacks. Symlinks that are part of "relPath" are never followed.
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// This function is implemented by walking the directory tree, starting at
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// "baseDir", using the Openat syscall with the O_NOFOLLOW flag.
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// Symlinks that are part of the "baseDir" path are followed.
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func OpenNofollow(baseDir string, relPath string, flags int, mode uint32) (fd int, err error) {
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if !filepath.IsAbs(baseDir) {
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tlog.Warn.Printf("BUG: OpenNofollow called with relative baseDir=%q", baseDir)
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return -1, syscall.EINVAL
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}
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if filepath.IsAbs(relPath) {
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tlog.Warn.Printf("BUG: OpenNofollow called with absolute relPath=%q", relPath)
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return -1, syscall.EINVAL
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}
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// Open the base dir
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dirfd, err := syscall.Open(baseDir, syscall.O_RDONLY, 0)
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if err != nil {
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return -1, err
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}
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// Split the path into components and separate intermediate directories
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// and the final basename
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parts := strings.Split(relPath, "/")
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dirs := parts[:len(parts)-1]
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final := parts[len(parts)-1]
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// Walk intermediate directories
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var dirfd2 int
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for _, name := range dirs {
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dirfd2, err = Openat(dirfd, name, syscall.O_RDONLY|syscall.O_NOFOLLOW, 0)
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syscall.Close(dirfd)
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if err != nil {
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return -1, err
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}
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dirfd = dirfd2
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}
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defer syscall.Close(dirfd)
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// Open the final component with the flags and permissions requested by
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// the user plus forced NOFOLLOW.
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return Openat(dirfd, final, flags|syscall.O_NOFOLLOW, mode)
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}
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37
internal/syscallcompat/open_nofollow_test.go
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37
internal/syscallcompat/open_nofollow_test.go
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package syscallcompat
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import (
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"os"
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"syscall"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestOpenNofollow(t *testing.T) {
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err := os.MkdirAll(tmpDir+"/d1/d2/d3", 0700)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Create a file
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fd, err := OpenNofollow(tmpDir, "d1/d2/d3/f1", syscall.O_RDWR|syscall.O_CREAT|syscall.O_EXCL, 0600)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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syscall.Close(fd)
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_, err = os.Stat(tmpDir + "/d1/d2/d3/f1")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Replace "d1" with a symlink - open should fail with ELOOP
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err = os.Rename(tmpDir+"/d1", tmpDir+"/d1.renamed")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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os.Symlink(tmpDir+"/d1.renamed", tmpDir+"/d1")
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fd, err = OpenNofollow(tmpDir, "d1/d2/d3/f1", syscall.O_RDWR|syscall.O_CREAT, 0600)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("should have failed")
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}
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if err != syscall.ELOOP {
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t.Errorf("expected ELOOP, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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