libgocryptfs: update to gocryptfs v2.2.0

internal/configfile/config_file.go

@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ func (cf *ConfFile) WriteFile() error {
 	err = fd.Sync()
 	if err != nil {
 		// This can happen on network drives: FRITZ.NAS mounted on MacOS returns
-		// "operation not supported": https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/issues/390
+		// "operation not supported": https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/390
 		// Try sync instead
 		syscall.Sync()
 	}
@@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ func getKeyEncrypter(scryptHash []byte, useHKDF bool) *contentenc.ContentEnc {
 	if useHKDF {
 		IVLen = contentenc.DefaultIVBits
 	}
-	cc := cryptocore.New(scryptHash, cryptocore.BackendGoGCM, IVLen, useHKDF, false)
+	cc := cryptocore.New(scryptHash, cryptocore.BackendGoGCM, IVLen, useHKDF)
-	ce := contentenc.New(cc, 4096, false)
+	ce := contentenc.New(cc, 4096)
 	return ce
 }
 

internal/contentenc/content.go

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
 	"sync"
 
 	"../cryptocore"
-	"../stupidgcm"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -40,8 +39,6 @@ type ContentEnc struct {
 	allZeroBlock []byte
 	// All-zero block of size IVBitLen/8, for fast compares
 	allZeroNonce []byte
-	// Force decode even if integrity check fails (openSSL only)
-	forceDecode bool
 
 	// Ciphertext block "sync.Pool" pool. Always returns cipherBS-sized byte
 	// slices (usually 4128 bytes).
@@ -59,7 +56,7 @@ type ContentEnc struct {
 }
 
 // New returns an initialized ContentEnc instance.
-func New(cc *cryptocore.CryptoCore, plainBS uint64, forceDecode bool) *ContentEnc {
+func New(cc *cryptocore.CryptoCore, plainBS uint64) *ContentEnc {
 	if MAX_KERNEL_WRITE%plainBS != 0 {
 		log.Panicf("unaligned MAX_KERNEL_WRITE=%d", MAX_KERNEL_WRITE)
 	}
@@ -77,7 +74,6 @@ func New(cc *cryptocore.CryptoCore, plainBS uint64, forceDecode bool) *ContentEn
 		cipherBS:     cipherBS,
 		allZeroBlock: make([]byte, cipherBS),
 		allZeroNonce: make([]byte, cc.IVLen),
-		forceDecode:  forceDecode,
 		cBlockPool:   newBPool(int(cipherBS)),
 		CReqPool:     newBPool(cReqSize),
 		pBlockPool:   newBPool(int(plainBS)),
@@ -107,10 +103,8 @@ func (be *ContentEnc) DecryptBlocks(ciphertext []byte, firstBlockNo uint64, file
 		var pBlock []byte
 		pBlock, err = be.DecryptBlock(cBlock, blockNo, fileID)
 		if err != nil {
-			if !(be.forceDecode && err == stupidgcm.ErrAuth) {
 			break
 		}
-		}
 		pBuf.Write(pBlock)
 		be.pBlockPool.Put(pBlock)
 		blockNo++
@@ -159,7 +153,7 @@ func (be *ContentEnc) DecryptBlock(ciphertext []byte, blockNo uint64, fileID []b
 	nonce := ciphertext[:be.cryptoCore.IVLen]
 	if bytes.Equal(nonce, be.allZeroNonce) {
 		// Bug in tmpfs?
-		// https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/issues/56
+		// https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/56
 		// http://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg2370127.html
 		return nil, errors.New("all-zero nonce")
 	}
@@ -172,9 +166,6 @@ func (be *ContentEnc) DecryptBlock(ciphertext []byte, blockNo uint64, fileID []b
 	plaintext, err := be.cryptoCore.AEADCipher.Open(plaintext, nonce, ciphertext, aData)
 
 	if err != nil {
-		if be.forceDecode && err == stupidgcm.ErrAuth {
-			return plaintext, err
-		}
 		return nil, err
 	}
 

internal/cryptocore/cryptocore.go

@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ type AEADTypeEnum struct {
 	NonceSize int
 }
 
-// BackendOpenSSL specifies the OpenSSL backend.
+// BackendOpenSSL specifies the OpenSSL AES-256-GCM backend.
 // "AES-GCM-256-OpenSSL" in gocryptfs -speed.
 var BackendOpenSSL AEADTypeEnum = AEADTypeEnum{"AES-GCM-256-OpenSSL", 16}
 
-// BackendGoGCM specifies the Go based GCM backend.
+// BackendGoGCM specifies the Go based AES-256-GCM backend.
 // "AES-GCM-256-Go" in gocryptfs -speed.
 var BackendGoGCM AEADTypeEnum = AEADTypeEnum{"AES-GCM-256-Go", 16}
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ var BackendAESSIV AEADTypeEnum = AEADTypeEnum{"AES-SIV-512-Go", siv_aead.NonceSi
 // "XChaCha20-Poly1305-Go" in gocryptfs -speed.
 var BackendXChaCha20Poly1305 AEADTypeEnum = AEADTypeEnum{"XChaCha20-Poly1305-Go", chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX}
 
+// BackendXChaCha20Poly1305OpenSSL specifies XChaCha20-Poly1305-OpenSSL.
+var BackendXChaCha20Poly1305OpenSSL AEADTypeEnum = AEADTypeEnum{"XChaCha20-Poly1305-OpenSSL", chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX}
+
 // CryptoCore is the low level crypto implementation.
 type CryptoCore struct {
 	// EME is used for filename encryption.
@@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ type CryptoCore struct {
 //
 // Note: "key" is either the scrypt hash of the password (when decrypting
 // a config file) or the masterkey (when finally mounting the filesystem).
-func New(key []byte, aeadType AEADTypeEnum, IVBitLen int, useHKDF bool, forceDecode bool) *CryptoCore {
+func New(key []byte, aeadType AEADTypeEnum, IVBitLen int, useHKDF bool) *CryptoCore {
 	if len(key) != KeyLen {
 		log.Panicf("Unsupported key length of %d bytes", len(key))
 	}
@@ -113,7 +116,7 @@ func New(key []byte, aeadType AEADTypeEnum, IVBitLen int, useHKDF bool, forceDec
 			if IVBitLen != 128 {
 				log.Panicf("stupidgcm only supports 128-bit IVs, you wanted %d", IVBitLen)
 			}
-			aeadCipher = stupidgcm.New(gcmKey, forceDecode)
+			aeadCipher = stupidgcm.NewAES256GCM(gcmKey)
 		case BackendGoGCM:
 			goGcmBlockCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(gcmKey)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -123,6 +126,8 @@ func New(key []byte, aeadType AEADTypeEnum, IVBitLen int, useHKDF bool, forceDec
 			if err != nil {
 				log.Panic(err)
 			}
+		default:
+			log.Panicf("BUG: unhandled case: %v", aeadType)
 		}
 		for i := range gcmKey {
 			gcmKey[i] = 0
@@ -147,7 +152,7 @@ func New(key []byte, aeadType AEADTypeEnum, IVBitLen int, useHKDF bool, forceDec
 		for i := range key64 {
 			key64[i] = 0
 		}
-	} else if aeadType == BackendXChaCha20Poly1305 {
+	} else if aeadType == BackendXChaCha20Poly1305 || aeadType == BackendXChaCha20Poly1305OpenSSL {
 		// We don't support legacy modes with XChaCha20-Poly1305
 		if IVBitLen != chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX*8 {
 			log.Panicf("XChaCha20-Poly1305 must use 192-bit IVs, you wanted %d", IVBitLen)
@@ -156,7 +161,13 @@ func New(key []byte, aeadType AEADTypeEnum, IVBitLen int, useHKDF bool, forceDec
 			log.Panic("XChaCha20-Poly1305 must use HKDF, but it is disabled")
 		}
 		derivedKey := hkdfDerive(key, hkdfInfoXChaChaPoly1305Content, chacha20poly1305.KeySize)
+		if aeadType == BackendXChaCha20Poly1305 {
 			aeadCipher, err = chacha20poly1305.NewX(derivedKey)
+		} else if aeadType == BackendXChaCha20Poly1305OpenSSL {
+			aeadCipher = stupidgcm.NewXchacha20poly1305(derivedKey)
+		} else {
+			log.Panicf("BUG: unhandled case: %v", aeadType)
+		}
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Panic(err)
 		}

internal/nametransform/diriv.go

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func WriteDirIVAt(dirfd int) error {
 	iv := cryptocore.RandBytes(DirIVLen)
 	// 0400 permissions: gocryptfs.diriv should never be modified after creation.
 	// Don't use "ioutil.WriteFile", it causes trouble on NFS:
-	// https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/commit/7d38f80a78644c8ec4900cc990bfb894387112ed
+	// https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/commit/7d38f80a78644c8ec4900cc990bfb894387112ed
 	fd, err := syscallcompat.Openat(dirfd, DirIVFilename, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, dirivPerms)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err

internal/nametransform/perms.go

@@ -6,14 +6,14 @@ const (
 	// never chmod'ed or chown'ed.
 	//
 	// Group-readable so the FS can be mounted by several users in the same group
-	// (see https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/issues/387 ).
+	// (see https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/387 ).
 	//
 	// Note that gocryptfs.conf is still created with 0400 permissions so the
 	// owner must explicitly chmod it to permit access.
 	//
 	// World-readable so an encrypted directory can be copied by the non-root
 	// owner when gocryptfs is running as root
-	// ( https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/issues/539 ).
+	// ( https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/539 ).
 	dirivPerms = 0444
 
 	// Permissions for gocryptfs.longname.[sha256].name files.

internal/stupidgcm/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+*.o

internal/stupidgcm/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+.PHONY: test
+test: gcc
+	# All three ways of building this must work
+	go build
+	go build -tags without_openssl
+	CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags without_openssl
+	# Likewise, all three ways of testing this must work
+	go test -v
+	go test -v -tags without_openssl
+	CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -v -tags without_openssl
+
+.PHONY: gcc
+gcc:
+	gcc -Wall -Wextra -Wformat-security -Wconversion -lcrypto -c *.c
+
+.PHONY: format
+format:
+	clang-format --style=WebKit -i *.c *.h

internal/stupidgcm/chacha.go

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// +build !without_openssl
+
+package stupidgcm
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"log"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
+)
+
+/*
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+*/
+import "C"
+
+type stupidChacha20poly1305 struct {
+	stupidAEADCommon
+}
+
+// Verify that we satisfy the cipher.AEAD interface
+var _ cipher.AEAD = &stupidChacha20poly1305{}
+
+// _EVP_chacha20_poly1305 caches C.EVP_chacha20_poly1305() to avoid the Cgo call
+// overhead for each instantiation of NewChacha20poly1305.
+var _EVP_chacha20_poly1305 *C.EVP_CIPHER
+
+func init() {
+	_EVP_chacha20_poly1305 = C.EVP_chacha20_poly1305()
+}
+
+// NewChacha20poly1305 returns a new instance of the OpenSSL ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD
+// cipher ( https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/EVP_chacha20_poly1305.html ).
+//
+// gocryptfs only uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 as a building block for OpenSSL
+// XChaCha20-Poly1305. This function is hot because it gets called once for each
+// block by XChaCha20-Poly1305.
+//
+// Only 32-bytes keys and 12-byte IVs are supported.
+func NewChacha20poly1305(key []byte) cipher.AEAD {
+	if len(key) != chacha20poly1305.KeySize {
+		log.Panicf("Only %d-byte keys are supported, you passed %d bytes", chacha20poly1305.KeySize, len(key))
+	}
+	// private copy
+	key2 := make([]byte, chacha20poly1305.KeySize)
+	copy(key2, key)
+	return &stupidChacha20poly1305{
+		stupidAEADCommon{
+			key:              key2,
+			openSSLEVPCipher: _EVP_chacha20_poly1305,
+			nonceSize:        chacha20poly1305.NonceSize,
+		},
+	}
+}

internal/stupidgcm/common.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+// +build !without_openssl
+
+package stupidgcm
+
+import (
+	"log"
+)
+
+/*
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+*/
+import "C"
+
+type stupidAEADCommon struct {
+	wiped            bool
+	key              []byte
+	openSSLEVPCipher *C.EVP_CIPHER
+	nonceSize        int
+}
+
+// Overhead returns the number of bytes that are added for authentication.
+//
+// Part of the cipher.AEAD interface.
+func (c *stupidAEADCommon) Overhead() int {
+	return tagLen
+}
+
+// NonceSize returns the required size of the nonce / IV
+//
+// Part of the cipher.AEAD interface.
+func (c *stupidAEADCommon) NonceSize() int {
+	return c.nonceSize
+}
+
+// Seal encrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst"
+//
+// Part of the cipher.AEAD interface.
+func (c *stupidAEADCommon) Seal(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) []byte {
+	return openSSLSeal(c, dst, iv, in, authData)
+}
+
+// Open decrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst"
+//
+// Part of the cipher.AEAD interface.
+func (c *stupidAEADCommon) Open(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	return openSSLOpen(c, dst, iv, in, authData)
+}
+
+// Wipe tries to wipe the key from memory by overwriting it with zeros.
+//
+// This is not bulletproof due to possible GC copies, but
+// still raises the bar for extracting the key.
+func (c *stupidAEADCommon) Wipe() {
+	key := c.key
+	c.wiped = true
+	c.key = nil
+	for i := range key {
+		key[i] = 0
+	}
+}
+
+func (c *stupidAEADCommon) Wiped() bool {
+	if c.wiped {
+		return true
+	}
+	if len(c.key) != keyLen {
+		log.Panicf("wrong key length %d", len(c.key))
+	}
+	return false
+}

internal/stupidgcm/doc.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// Package stupidgcm wraps OpenSSL to provide a cipher.AEAD interface for
+// authenticated encryption algorithms.
+//
+// The supported algorithms are:
+//
+// (1) AES-GCM-256 (OpenSSL EVP_aes_256_gcm)
+//
+// (2) ChaCha20-Poly1305 (OpenSSL EVP_chacha20_poly1305)
+//
+// (3) XChaCha20-Poly1305 (OpenSSL EVP_chacha20_poly1305 + Go HChaCha20)
+//
+// The golang.org/x/crypto libraries provides implementations for all algorithms,
+// and the test suite verifies that the implementation in this package gives
+// the exact same results.
+//
+// However, OpenSSL has optimized assembly for almost all platforms, which Go
+// does not. Example for a 32-bit ARM device (Odroid XU4):
+//
+//   $ gocrypts -speed
+//   gocryptfs v2.1-68-gedf9d4c.stupidchacha; go-fuse v2.1.1-0.20210825171523-3ab5d95a30ae; 2021-09-04 go1.16.7 linux/arm
+//   AES-GCM-256-OpenSSL               56.84 MB/s    (selected in auto mode)
+//   AES-GCM-256-Go                    16.61 MB/s
+//   AES-SIV-512-Go                    16.49 MB/s
+//   XChaCha20-Poly1305-Go             39.08 MB/s    (use via -xchacha flag)
+//   XChaCha20-Poly1305-OpenSSL       141.82 MB/s
+//
+// This package is "stupid" in the sense that it only supports a narrow set of
+// key- and iv-lengths, and panics if it does not like what you pass it.
+// See the constructor functions for which restrictions apply for each algorithm.
+// Also, it is only tested for block lengths up to 5000 bytes, because this is
+// what gocryptfs uses.
+//
+// Corrupt ciphertexts never cause a panic. Instead, ErrAuth is returned on
+// decryption.
+//
+// XChaCha20-Poly1305
+//
+// The XChaCha20-Poly1305 implementation is more complicated than the others,
+// because OpenSSL does not support XChaCha20-Poly1305 directly. Follow
+// https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5523 to get notified when it is
+// accepted into OpenSSL.
+//
+// Fortunately, XChaCha20-Poly1305 is just ChaCha20-Poly1305 with some key+iv
+// mixing using HChaCha20 in front:
+//
+//     key (32 bytes), iv (24 bytes)
+//      |
+//      v
+//     HChaCha20 (provided by golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20)
+//      |
+//      v
+//     key2 (32 bytes), iv2 (16 bytes)
+//      |
+//      v
+//     ChaCha20-Poly1305 (OpenSSL EVP_chacha20_poly1305)
+//
+// As HChaCha20 is very fast, XChaCha20-Poly1305 gets almost the same throughput
+// as ChaCha20-Poly1305 (for 4kiB blocks).
+package stupidgcm

internal/stupidgcm/gcm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// +build !without_openssl
+
+package stupidgcm
+
+// #include <openssl/evp.h>
+import "C"
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"log"
+)
+
+const (
+	// BuiltWithoutOpenssl indicates if openssl been disabled at compile-time
+	BuiltWithoutOpenssl = false
+
+	keyLen = 32
+	ivLen  = 16
+	tagLen = 16
+)
+
+type stupidGCM struct {
+	stupidAEADCommon
+}
+
+// NewAES256GCM returns a new AES-256-GCM cipher that satisfies the cipher.AEAD interface.
+//
+// Only 32-bytes keys and 16-byte IVs are supported.
+func NewAES256GCM(keyIn []byte) cipher.AEAD {
+	if len(keyIn) != keyLen {
+		log.Panicf("Only %d-byte keys are supported", keyLen)
+	}
+	return &stupidGCM{
+		stupidAEADCommon{
+			// Create a private copy of the key
+			key:              append([]byte{}, keyIn...),
+			openSSLEVPCipher: C.EVP_aes_256_gcm(),
+			nonceSize:        ivLen,
+		},
+	}
+}

internal/stupidgcm/openssl.go

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// +build !without_openssl
+
+package stupidgcm
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"log"
+)
+
+/*
+#include "openssl_aead.h"
+#cgo pkg-config: libcrypto
+*/
+import "C"
+
+func openSSLSeal(a *stupidAEADCommon, dst, iv, in, authData []byte) []byte {
+	if a.Wiped() {
+		log.Panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key")
+	}
+	if len(iv) != a.NonceSize() {
+		log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported, you passed %d bytes", a.NonceSize(), len(iv))
+	}
+
+	// If the "dst" slice is large enough we can use it as our output buffer
+	outLen := len(in) + tagLen
+	var buf []byte
+	inplace := false
+	if cap(dst)-len(dst) >= outLen {
+		inplace = true
+		buf = dst[len(dst) : len(dst)+outLen]
+	} else {
+		buf = make([]byte, outLen)
+	}
+
+	res := int(C.openssl_aead_seal(a.openSSLEVPCipher,
+		slicePointerOrNull(in),
+		C.int(len(in)),
+		(*C.uchar)(&authData[0]),
+		C.int(len(authData)),
+		(*C.uchar)(&a.key[0]),
+		C.int(len(a.key)),
+		(*C.uchar)(&iv[0]),
+		C.int(len(iv)),
+		(*C.uchar)(&buf[0]),
+		C.int(len(buf))))
+
+	if res != outLen {
+		log.Panicf("expected length %d, got %d", outLen, res)
+	}
+
+	if inplace {
+		return dst[:len(dst)+outLen]
+	}
+	return append(dst, buf...)
+}
+
+func openSSLOpen(a *stupidAEADCommon, dst, iv, in, authData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if a.Wiped() {
+		log.Panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key")
+	}
+	if len(iv) != a.NonceSize() {
+		log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported, you passed %d bytes", a.NonceSize(), len(iv))
+	}
+	if len(in) < tagLen {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("stupidChacha20poly1305: input data too short (%d bytes)", len(in))
+	}
+
+	// If the "dst" slice is large enough we can use it as our output buffer
+	outLen := len(in) - tagLen
+	var buf []byte
+	inplace := false
+	if cap(dst)-len(dst) >= outLen {
+		inplace = true
+		buf = dst[len(dst) : len(dst)+outLen]
+	} else {
+		buf = make([]byte, len(in)-tagLen)
+	}
+
+	ciphertext := in[:len(in)-tagLen]
+	tag := in[len(in)-tagLen:]
+
+	res := int(C.openssl_aead_open(a.openSSLEVPCipher,
+		slicePointerOrNull(ciphertext),
+		C.int(len(ciphertext)),
+		(*C.uchar)(&authData[0]),
+		C.int(len(authData)),
+		(*C.uchar)(&tag[0]),
+		C.int(len(tag)),
+		(*C.uchar)(&a.key[0]),
+		C.int(len(a.key)),
+		(*C.uchar)(&iv[0]),
+		C.int(len(iv)),
+		slicePointerOrNull(buf),
+		C.int(len(buf))))
+
+	if res < 0 {
+		return nil, ErrAuth
+	}
+	if res != outLen {
+		log.Panicf("unexpected length %d", res)
+	}
+
+	if inplace {
+		return dst[:len(dst)+outLen], nil
+	}
+	return append(dst, buf...), nil
+}
+
+// slicePointerOrNull returns a C pointer to the beginning of the byte slice,
+// or NULL if the byte slice is empty. This is useful for slices that can be
+// empty, otherwise you can directly use "(*C.uchar)(&s[0])".
+func slicePointerOrNull(s []byte) (ptr *C.uchar) {
+	if len(s) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	return (*C.uchar)(&s[0])
+}
+
+// This functions exists to benchmark the C call overhead from Go.
+// See BenchmarkCCall for resuts.
+func noopCFunction() {
+	C.noop_c_function()
+}

internal/stupidgcm/openssl_aead.c

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+// +build !without_openssl
+
+#include "openssl_aead.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+//#cgo pkg-config: libcrypto
+
+static void panic(const char* const msg)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "panic in C code: %s\n", msg);
+    __builtin_trap();
+}
+
+// We only support 16-byte tags
+static const int supportedTagLen = 16;
+
+// https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Authenticated_Encryption_and_Decryption#Authenticated_Encryption_using_GCM_mode
+int openssl_aead_seal(
+    const EVP_CIPHER* evpCipher,
+    const unsigned char* const plaintext,
+    const int plaintextLen,
+    const unsigned char* const authData,
+    const int authDataLen,
+    const unsigned char* const key,
+    const int keyLen,
+    const unsigned char* const iv,
+    const int ivLen,
+    unsigned char* const ciphertext,
+    const int ciphertextBufLen)
+{
+    // Create scratch space "ctx"
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (!ctx) {
+        panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failed");
+    }
+
+    // Set cipher
+    if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, evpCipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptInit_ex set cipher failed");
+    }
+
+    // Check keyLen by trying to set it (fails if keyLen != 32)
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, keyLen) != 1) {
+        panic("keyLen mismatch");
+    }
+
+    // Set IV length so we do not depend on the default
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivLen, NULL) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN failed");
+    }
+
+    // Set key and IV
+    if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptInit_ex set key & iv failed");
+    }
+
+    // Provide authentication data
+    int outLen = 0;
+    if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outLen, authData, authDataLen) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptUpdate authData failed");
+    }
+    if (outLen != authDataLen) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptUpdate authData: unexpected length");
+    }
+
+    // Encrypt "plaintext" into "ciphertext"
+    if (plaintextLen > ciphertextBufLen) {
+        panic("plaintext overflows output buffer");
+    }
+    if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &outLen, plaintext, plaintextLen) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptUpdate ciphertext failed");
+    }
+    if (outLen != plaintextLen) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptUpdate ciphertext: unexpected length");
+    }
+    int ciphertextLen = outLen;
+
+    // Finalise encryption
+    // Normally ciphertext bytes may be written at this stage, but this does not occur in GCM mode
+    if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + plaintextLen, &outLen) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptFinal_ex failed");
+    }
+    if (outLen != 0) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptFinal_ex: unexpected length");
+    }
+
+    // Get MAC tag and append it to the ciphertext
+    if (ciphertextLen + supportedTagLen > ciphertextBufLen) {
+        panic("tag overflows output buffer");
+    }
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, supportedTagLen, ciphertext + plaintextLen) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG failed");
+    }
+    ciphertextLen += supportedTagLen;
+
+    // Free scratch space
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ciphertextLen;
+}
+
+int openssl_aead_open(
+    const EVP_CIPHER* evpCipher,
+    const unsigned char* const ciphertext,
+    const int ciphertextLen,
+    const unsigned char* const authData,
+    const int authDataLen,
+    unsigned char* const tag,
+    const int tagLen,
+    const unsigned char* const key,
+    const int keyLen,
+    const unsigned char* const iv,
+    const int ivLen,
+    unsigned char* const plaintext,
+    const int plaintextBufLen)
+{
+    // Create scratch space "ctx"
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (!ctx) {
+        panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failed");
+    }
+
+    // Set cipher
+    if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, evpCipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_DecryptInit_ex set cipher failed");
+    }
+
+    // Check keyLen by trying to set it (fails if keyLen != 32)
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, keyLen) != 1) {
+        panic("keyLen mismatch");
+    }
+
+    // Set IV length so we do not depend on the default
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivLen, NULL) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN failed");
+    }
+
+    // Set key and IV
+    if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_DecryptInit_ex set key & iv failed");
+    }
+
+    // Provide authentication data
+    int outLen = 0;
+    if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outLen, authData, authDataLen) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate authData failed");
+    }
+    if (outLen != authDataLen) {
+        panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate authData: unexpected length");
+    }
+
+    // Decrypt "ciphertext" into "plaintext"
+    if (ciphertextLen > plaintextBufLen) {
+        panic("ciphertextLen overflows output buffer");
+    }
+    if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, plaintext, &outLen, ciphertext, ciphertextLen) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate failed");
+    }
+    int plaintextLen = outLen;
+
+    // Check tag
+    if (tagLen != supportedTagLen) {
+        panic("unsupported tag length");
+    }
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tagLen, tag) != 1) {
+        panic("EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG failed");
+    }
+    if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, plaintext + plaintextLen, &outLen) != 1) {
+        // authentication failed
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (outLen != 0) {
+        panic("EVP_EncryptFinal_ex: unexpected length");
+    }
+
+    /* Clean up */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return plaintextLen;
+}
+
+// This functions exists to benchmark the C call overhead from Go.
+void noop_c_function(void) {
+    return;
+}

internal/stupidgcm/openssl_aead.h

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int openssl_aead_seal(
+    const EVP_CIPHER* evpCipher,
+    const unsigned char* const plaintext,
+    const int plaintextLen,
+    const unsigned char* const authData,
+    const int authDataLen,
+    const unsigned char* const key,
+    const int keyLen,
+    const unsigned char* const iv,
+    const int ivLen,
+    unsigned char* const ciphertext,
+    const int ciphertextBufLen);
+
+int openssl_aead_open(
+    const EVP_CIPHER* evpCipher,
+    const unsigned char* const ciphertext,
+    const int ciphertextLen,
+    const unsigned char* const authData,
+    const int authDataLen,
+    unsigned char* const tag,
+    const int tagLen,
+    const unsigned char* const key,
+    const int keyLen,
+    const unsigned char* const iv,
+    const int ivLen,
+    unsigned char* const plaintext,
+    const int plaintextBufLen);
+
+void noop_c_function(void);

internal/stupidgcm/prefer.go

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ import (
 	"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
 )
 
-// PreferOpenSSL tells us if OpenSSL is faster than Go GCM on this machine.
+// PreferOpenSSLAES256GCM tells us if OpenSSL AES-256-GCM is faster than Go stdlib
+// on this machine.
 //
 // Go GCM is only faster if the CPU either:
 //
@@ -14,22 +15,46 @@ import (
 // 2) Is ARM64  && has AES instructions && Go is v1.11 or higher
 //    (commit https://github.com/golang/go/commit/4f1f503373cda7160392be94e3849b0c9b9ebbda)
 //
-// See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/wiki/CPU-Benchmarks
+// See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/wiki/CPU-Benchmarks
 // for benchmarks.
-func PreferOpenSSL() bool {
+func PreferOpenSSLAES256GCM() bool {
 	if BuiltWithoutOpenssl {
 		return false
 	}
-	// Safe to call on other architectures - will just read false.
+	// If the CPU has AES acceleration, Go stdlib is faster
-	if cpu.X86.HasAES || cpu.ARM64.HasAES {
+	if CpuHasAES() {
-		// Go stdlib is probably faster
 		return false
 	}
-	// On the Apple M1, Go stdlib is faster than OpenSSL, despite cpu.ARM64.HasAES
+	// Otherwise OpenSSL is probably faster
-	// reading false: https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/issues/556#issuecomment-848079309
-	if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" && runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" {
-		return false
-	}
-	// OpenSSL is probably faster
 	return true
 }
+
+// PreferOpenSSLXchacha20poly1305 returns true if OpenSSL Xchacha20poly1305 is
+// faster than Go stdlib on this machine.
+func PreferOpenSSLXchacha20poly1305() bool {
+	if BuiltWithoutOpenssl {
+		return false
+	}
+	// Go x/crypto has optimized assembly for amd64:
+	// https://github.com/golang/crypto/blob/master/chacha20poly1305/chacha20poly1305_amd64.s
+	if runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" {
+		return false
+	}
+	// On arm64 and arm, OpenSSL is faster. Probably everwhere else too.
+	return true
+}
+
+// CpuHasAES tells you if the CPU we are running has AES acceleration that is
+// usable by the Go crypto library.
+func CpuHasAES() bool {
+	// Safe to call on other architectures - will just read false.
+	if cpu.X86.HasAES || cpu.ARM64.HasAES {
+		return true
+	}
+	// On the Apple M1, the CPU has AES acceleration, despite cpu.ARM64.HasAES
+	// reading false: https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/556#issuecomment-848079309
+	if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" && runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" {
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}

internal/stupidgcm/stupidgcm.go

@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
-// +build !without_openssl
-
-// Package stupidgcm is a thin wrapper for OpenSSL's GCM encryption and
-// decryption functions. It only support 32-byte keys and 16-bit IVs.
-package stupidgcm
-
-// #include <openssl/evp.h>
-// #cgo pkg-config: libcrypto
-import "C"
-
-import (
-	"crypto/cipher"
-	"fmt"
-	"log"
-	"unsafe"
-)
-
-const (
-	// BuiltWithoutOpenssl indicates if openssl been disabled at compile-time
-	BuiltWithoutOpenssl = false
-
-	keyLen = 32
-	ivLen  = 16
-	tagLen = 16
-)
-
-// StupidGCM implements the cipher.AEAD interface
-type StupidGCM struct {
-	key         []byte
-	forceDecode bool
-}
-
-// Verify that we satisfy the cipher.AEAD interface
-var _ cipher.AEAD = &StupidGCM{}
-
-// New returns a new cipher.AEAD implementation..
-func New(keyIn []byte, forceDecode bool) cipher.AEAD {
-	if len(keyIn) != keyLen {
-		log.Panicf("Only %d-byte keys are supported", keyLen)
-	}
-	// Create a private copy of the key
-	key := append([]byte{}, keyIn...)
-	return &StupidGCM{key: key, forceDecode: forceDecode}
-}
-
-// NonceSize returns the required size of the nonce / IV.
-func (g *StupidGCM) NonceSize() int {
-	return ivLen
-}
-
-// Overhead returns the number of bytes that are added for authentication.
-func (g *StupidGCM) Overhead() int {
-	return tagLen
-}
-
-// Seal encrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst"
-func (g *StupidGCM) Seal(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) []byte {
-	if len(iv) != ivLen {
-		log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported", ivLen)
-	}
-	if len(in) == 0 {
-		log.Panic("Zero-length input data is not supported")
-	}
-	if len(g.key) != keyLen {
-		log.Panicf("Wrong key length: %d. Key has been wiped?", len(g.key))
-	}
-
-	// If the "dst" slice is large enough we can use it as our output buffer
-	outLen := len(in) + tagLen
-	var buf []byte
-	inplace := false
-	if cap(dst)-len(dst) >= outLen {
-		inplace = true
-		buf = dst[len(dst) : len(dst)+outLen]
-	} else {
-		buf = make([]byte, outLen)
-	}
-
-	// https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Authenticated_Encryption_and_Decryption#Authenticated_Encryption_using_GCM_mode
-
-	// Create scratch space "context"
-	ctx := C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()
-	if ctx == nil {
-		log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failed")
-	}
-
-	// Set cipher to AES-256
-	if C.EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, C.EVP_aes_256_gcm(), nil, nil, nil) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_EncryptInit_ex I failed")
-	}
-
-	// Use 16-byte IV
-	if C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, C.EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, ivLen, nil) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN failed")
-	}
-
-	// Set key and IV
-	if C.EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, nil, nil, (*C.uchar)(&g.key[0]), (*C.uchar)(&iv[0])) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_EncryptInit_ex II failed")
-	}
-
-	// Provide authentication data
-	var resultLen C.int
-	if C.EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, nil, &resultLen, (*C.uchar)(&authData[0]), C.int(len(authData))) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_EncryptUpdate authData failed")
-	}
-	if int(resultLen) != len(authData) {
-		log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
-	}
-
-	// Encrypt "in" into "buf"
-	if C.EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, (*C.uchar)(&buf[0]), &resultLen, (*C.uchar)(&in[0]), C.int(len(in))) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_EncryptUpdate failed")
-	}
-	if int(resultLen) != len(in) {
-		log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
-	}
-
-	// Finalise encryption
-	// Because GCM is a stream encryption, this will not write out any data.
-	dummy := make([]byte, 16)
-	if C.EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, (*C.uchar)(&dummy[0]), &resultLen) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_EncryptFinal_ex failed")
-	}
-	if resultLen != 0 {
-		log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
-	}
-
-	// Get GMAC tag and append it to the ciphertext in "buf"
-	if C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, C.EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tagLen, (unsafe.Pointer)(&buf[len(in)])) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG failed")
-	}
-
-	// Free scratch space
-	C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx)
-
-	if inplace {
-		return dst[:len(dst)+outLen]
-	}
-	return append(dst, buf...)
-}
-
-// Open decrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst"
-func (g *StupidGCM) Open(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
-	if len(iv) != ivLen {
-		log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported", ivLen)
-	}
-	if len(g.key) != keyLen {
-		log.Panicf("Wrong key length: %d. Key has been wiped?", len(g.key))
-	}
-	if len(in) <= tagLen {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("stupidgcm: input data too short (%d bytes)", len(in))
-	}
-
-	// If the "dst" slice is large enough we can use it as our output buffer
-	outLen := len(in) - tagLen
-	var buf []byte
-	inplace := false
-	if cap(dst)-len(dst) >= outLen {
-		inplace = true
-		buf = dst[len(dst) : len(dst)+outLen]
-	} else {
-		buf = make([]byte, len(in)-tagLen)
-	}
-
-	ciphertext := in[:len(in)-tagLen]
-	tag := in[len(in)-tagLen:]
-
-	// https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Authenticated_Encryption_and_Decryption#Authenticated_Encryption_using_GCM_mode
-
-	// Create scratch space "context"
-	ctx := C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()
-	if ctx == nil {
-		log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failed")
-	}
-
-	// Set cipher to AES-256
-	if C.EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, C.EVP_aes_256_gcm(), nil, nil, nil) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_DecryptInit_ex I failed")
-	}
-
-	// Use 16-byte IV
-	if C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, C.EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, ivLen, nil) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN failed")
-	}
-
-	// Set key and IV
-	if C.EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, nil, nil, (*C.uchar)(&g.key[0]), (*C.uchar)(&iv[0])) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_DecryptInit_ex II failed")
-	}
-
-	// Set expected GMAC tag
-	if C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, C.EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, tagLen, (unsafe.Pointer)(&tag[0])) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl failed")
-	}
-
-	// Provide authentication data
-	var resultLen C.int
-	if C.EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, nil, &resultLen, (*C.uchar)(&authData[0]), C.int(len(authData))) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate authData failed")
-	}
-	if int(resultLen) != len(authData) {
-		log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
-	}
-
-	// Decrypt "ciphertext" into "buf"
-	if C.EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, (*C.uchar)(&buf[0]), &resultLen, (*C.uchar)(&ciphertext[0]), C.int(len(ciphertext))) != 1 {
-		log.Panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate failed")
-	}
-	if int(resultLen) != len(ciphertext) {
-		log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
-	}
-
-	// Check GMAC
-	dummy := make([]byte, 16)
-	res := C.EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, (*C.uchar)(&dummy[0]), &resultLen)
-	if resultLen != 0 {
-		log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
-	}
-
-	// Free scratch space
-	C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx)
-
-	if res != 1 {
-		// The error code must always be checked by the calling function, because the decrypted buffer
-		// may contain corrupted data that we are returning in case the user forced reads
-		if g.forceDecode {
-			return append(dst, buf...), ErrAuth
-		}
-		return nil, ErrAuth
-	}
-
-	if inplace {
-		return dst[:len(dst)+outLen], nil
-	}
-	return append(dst, buf...), nil
-}
-
-// Wipe tries to wipe the AES key from memory by overwriting it with zeros
-// and setting the reference to nil.
-//
-// This is not bulletproof due to possible GC copies, but
-// still raises to bar for extracting the key.
-func (g *StupidGCM) Wipe() {
-	for i := range g.key {
-		g.key[i] = 0
-	}
-	g.key = nil
-}

internal/stupidgcm/xchacha.go

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+// +build !without_openssl
+
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+//
+// Copied from
+// https://github.com/golang/crypto/blob/32db794688a5a24a23a43f2a984cecd5b3d8da58/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go
+// and adapted for stupidgcm by @rfjakob.
+
+package stupidgcm
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"errors"
+	"log"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
+)
+
+type stupidXchacha20poly1305 struct {
+	// array instead of byte slice like
+	// `struct xchacha20poly1305` in x/crypto/chacha20poly1305
+	key   [chacha20poly1305.KeySize]byte
+	wiped bool
+}
+
+// NewXchacha20poly1305 returns a XChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher that satisfied the
+// cipher.AEAD interface.
+//
+// XChaCha20-Poly1305 is a ChaCha20-Poly1305 variant that takes a longer nonce,
+// suitable to be generated randomly without risk of collisions. It should be
+// preferred when nonce uniqueness cannot be trivially ensured, or whenever
+// nonces are randomly generated.
+//
+// Only 32-bytes keys and 24-byte IVs are supported.
+func NewXchacha20poly1305(key []byte) cipher.AEAD {
+	if len(key) != chacha20poly1305.KeySize {
+		log.Panic("bad key length")
+	}
+	ret := new(stupidXchacha20poly1305)
+	copy(ret.key[:], key)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (*stupidXchacha20poly1305) NonceSize() int {
+	return chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX
+}
+
+func (*stupidXchacha20poly1305) Overhead() int {
+	return tagLen
+}
+
+func (x *stupidXchacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+	if x.wiped {
+		log.Panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key")
+	}
+	if len(nonce) != chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX {
+		log.Panic("bad nonce length passed to Seal")
+	}
+
+	// XChaCha20-Poly1305 technically supports a 64-bit counter, so there is no
+	// size limit. However, since we reuse the ChaCha20-Poly1305 implementation,
+	// the second half of the counter is not available. This is unlikely to be
+	// an issue because the cipher.AEAD API requires the entire message to be in
+	// memory, and the counter overflows at 256 GB.
+	if uint64(len(plaintext)) > (1<<38)-64 {
+		log.Panic("plaintext too large")
+	}
+
+	hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16])
+	c := NewChacha20poly1305(hKey).(*stupidChacha20poly1305)
+	defer c.Wipe()
+
+	// The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space.
+	cNonce := make([]byte, chacha20poly1305.NonceSize)
+	copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24])
+
+	return c.Seal(dst, cNonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
+}
+
+func (x *stupidXchacha20poly1305) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if x.wiped {
+		log.Panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key")
+	}
+	if len(nonce) != chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX {
+		log.Panic("bad nonce length passed to Open")
+	}
+	if len(ciphertext) < 16 {
+		return nil, errors.New("message too short")
+	}
+	if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > (1<<38)-48 {
+		log.Panic("ciphertext too large")
+	}
+
+	hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16])
+	c := NewChacha20poly1305(hKey).(*stupidChacha20poly1305)
+	defer c.Wipe()
+
+	// The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space.
+	cNonce := make([]byte, chacha20poly1305.NonceSize)
+	copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24])
+
+	return c.Open(dst, cNonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
+}
+
+// Wipe tries to wipe the key from memory by overwriting it with zeros.
+//
+// This is not bulletproof due to possible GC copies, but
+// still raises the bar for extracting the key.
+func (g *stupidXchacha20poly1305) Wipe() {
+	g.wiped = true
+	for i := range g.key {
+		g.key[i] = 0
+	}
+}

internal/syscallcompat/eintr.go

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
 // https://github.com/golang/go/blob/d2a80f3fb5b44450e0b304ac5a718f99c053d82a/src/os/file_posix.go#L243
 //
 // This is needed because CIFS throws lots of EINTR errors:
-// https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/issues/483
+// https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/483
 //
 // Don't use retryEINTR() with syscall.Close()!
 // See https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=269623 .

internal/syscallcompat/getdents_linux.go

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ const sizeofDirent = int(unsafe.Sizeof(unix.Dirent{}))
 
 // maxReclen sanity check: Reclen should never be larger than this.
 // Due to padding between entries, it is 280 even on 32-bit architectures.
-// See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/issues/197 for details.
+// See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/197 for details.
 const maxReclen = 280
 
 type DirEntry struct {

internal/syscallcompat/sys_linux.go

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func EnospcPrealloc(fd int, off int64, len int64) (err error) {
 		}
 		if err == syscall.EOPNOTSUPP {
 			// ZFS and ext3 do not support fallocate. Warn but continue anyway.
-			// https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/issues/22
+			// https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/22
 			return nil
 		}
 		return err

main.go

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+// gocryptfs is an encrypted overlay filesystem written in Go.
+// See README.md ( https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/blob/master/README.md )
+// and the official website ( https://nuetzlich.net/gocryptfs/ ) for details.
 package main
 
 func main() {}

volume.go

@@ -64,18 +64,25 @@ func registerNewVolume(rootCipherDir string, masterkey []byte, cf *configfile.Co
 
 	newVolume.plainTextNames = cf.IsFeatureFlagSet(configfile.FlagPlaintextNames)
 
-	// Init crypto backend
+	cryptoBackend, err := cf.ContentEncryption()
-	cryptoBackend := cryptocore.BackendGoGCM
+	if err != nil {
-	if cf.IsFeatureFlagSet(configfile.FlagAESSIV) {
+		return -1
-		cryptoBackend = cryptocore.BackendAESSIV
+	}
-	} else if stupidgcm.PreferOpenSSL() {
+	if cryptoBackend == cryptocore.BackendXChaCha20Poly1305 && stupidgcm.PreferOpenSSLXchacha20poly1305() {
+		cryptoBackend = cryptocore.BackendXChaCha20Poly1305OpenSSL
+	} else if cryptoBackend == cryptocore.BackendGoGCM && stupidgcm.PreferOpenSSLAES256GCM() {
 		cryptoBackend = cryptocore.BackendOpenSSL
 	}
-	forcedecode := false
+	newVolume.cryptoCore = cryptocore.New(masterkey, cryptoBackend, cryptoBackend.NonceSize*8, cf.IsFeatureFlagSet(configfile.FlagHKDF))
-	newVolume.cryptoCore = cryptocore.New(masterkey, cryptoBackend, contentenc.DefaultIVBits, true, forcedecode)
+	newVolume.contentEnc = contentenc.New(newVolume.cryptoCore, contentenc.DefaultBS)
-	newVolume.contentEnc = contentenc.New(newVolume.cryptoCore, contentenc.DefaultBS, forcedecode)
 	var badname []string
-	newVolume.nameTransform = nametransform.New(newVolume.cryptoCore.EMECipher, true, true, badname, false)
+	newVolume.nameTransform = nametransform.New(
+		newVolume.cryptoCore.EMECipher,
+		true,
+		cf.IsFeatureFlagSet(configfile.FlagRaw64),
+		badname,
+		!cf.IsFeatureFlagSet(configfile.FlagDirIV),
+	)
 
 	//copying rootCipherDir
 	var grcd strings.Builder
@@ -155,7 +162,16 @@ func gcf_change_password(rootCipherDir string, oldPassword, givenScryptHash, new
 }
 
 //export gcf_create_volume
-func gcf_create_volume(rootCipherDir string, password []byte, plaintextNames bool, logN int, creator string) bool {
+func gcf_create_volume(rootCipherDir string, password []byte, plaintextNames bool, xchacha int8, logN int, creator string) bool {
+	var useXChaCha bool
+	switch xchacha {
+	case 1:
+		useXChaCha = true
+	case 0:
+		useXChaCha = false
+	default:
+		useXChaCha = !stupidgcm.CpuHasAES()
+	}
 	err := configfile.Create(&configfile.CreateArgs{
 		Filename:           filepath.Join(rootCipherDir, configfile.ConfDefaultName),
 		Password:           password,
@@ -164,7 +180,7 @@ func gcf_create_volume(rootCipherDir string, password []byte, plaintextNames boo
 		Creator:            creator,
 		AESSIV:             false,
 		DeterministicNames: false,
-		XChaCha20Poly1305:  false,
+		XChaCha20Poly1305:  useXChaCha,
 	})
 	if err == nil {
 		if plaintextNames {