When running
$ go test ./tests/matrix/
in isolation, it failed like this:
fd leak? before, after:
[0r=/dev/null 3w=/dev/null 5r=/proc/8078/fd (hidden:4)]
[0r=/dev/null 3w=/dev/null 5w=/tmp/go-build366655199/b001/testlog.txt 7r=/proc/8078/fd (hidden:4)]
Filter by prefix to get rid of this spurious test failure.
This should get rid of
Openat: O_NOFOLLOW missing: flags = 0x0
Fchmodat: adding missing AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag
sys_common_test.go:203: chmod on symlink should have failed, but did not. New mode=0333
UnmountErr: "[...]/057376762.mnt" was not found in MountInfo, cannot check for FD leak
and add some context to
--- FAIL: TestUtimesNano (0.00s)
matrix_test.go:628: no such file or directory
See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/pull/343#issuecomment-453888006
for full test output
Instead of reporting the consequence:
matrix_test.go:906: modeHave 0664 != modeWant 0777
Report it if chmod itself fails, and also report the old file mode:
matrix_test.go:901: chmod 000 -> 777 failed: bad file descriptor
And fix two in test_helpers.Mount().
Leftover fds can cause an unmount failure like this later:
fusermount: failed to unmount /tmp/gocryptfs-test-parent/873632270/default-plain: Device or resource busy
so try to catch them early.
macos does not have lazy unmount, so let's not use it
on linux either.
If the unmount fails, run "lsof" to find the open file.
Also fix the first bug we found this way.
We relied on the finalizer to close a few fds.
For some reason, this did not cause problems on Linux,
but on MacOS, it causes unmount failures:
umount(/private/tmp/gocryptfs-test-parent/194654785/default-plain): Resource busy -- try 'diskutil unmount'
In PlaintextNames mode the "gocryptfs.longname." prefix does not have any
special meaning. We should not attempt to delete any .name files.
Partially fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/174
In PlaintextNames mode the "gocryptfs.longname." prefix does not have any
special meaning. We should not attempt to read the directory IV or to
create special .name files.
Partially fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/174
If the user manages to replace the directory with
a symlink at just the right time, we could be tricked
into chown'ing the wrong file.
This change fixes the race by using fchownat, which
unfortunately is not available on darwin, hence a compat
wrapper is added.
Scenario, as described by @slackner at
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/177 :
1. Create a forward mount point with `plaintextnames` enabled
2. Mount as root user with `allow_other`
3. For testing purposes create a file `/tmp/file_owned_by_root`
which is owned by the root user
4. As a regular user run inside of the GoCryptFS mount:
```
mkdir tempdir
mknod tempdir/file_owned_by_root p &
mv tempdir tempdir2
ln -s /tmp tempdir
```
When the steps are done fast enough and in the right order
(run in a loop!), the device file will be created in
`tempdir`, but the `lchown` will be executed by following
the symlink. As a result, the ownership of the file located
at `/tmp/file_owned_by_root` will be changed.
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/170
Steps to reproduce the problem:
* Create a regular forward mount point
* Create a file with a shortname and one with a long filename
* Try to run 'mv <shortname> <longname>'
This should actually work and replace the existing file, but instead it
fails with:
mv: cannot move '<shortname>' to '<longname>': File exists
The problem is the creation of the .name file. If the target already exists
we can safely ignore the EEXIST error and just keep the existing .name file.
