package fusefrontend_reverse import ( "context" "path/filepath" "syscall" "golang.org/x/sys/unix" "github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2/fs" "github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2/fuse" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/configfile" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/pathiv" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/syscallcompat" ) const ( // File names are padded to 16-byte multiples, encrypted and // base64-encoded. We can encode at most 176 bytes to stay below the 255 // bytes limit: // * base64(176 bytes) = 235 bytes // * base64(192 bytes) = 256 bytes (over 255!) // But the PKCS#7 padding is at least one byte. This means we can only use // 175 bytes for the file name. shortNameMax = 175 ) // translateSize translates the ciphertext size in `out` into plaintext size. func (n *Node) translateSize(dirfd int, cName string, pName string, out *fuse.Attr) { if out.IsRegular() { rn := n.rootNode() out.Size = rn.contentEnc.PlainSizeToCipherSize(out.Size) } else if out.IsSymlink() { cLink, _ := n.readlink(dirfd, cName, pName) out.Size = uint64(len(cLink)) } } // Path returns the relative plaintext path of this node func (n *Node) Path() string { return n.Inode.Path(n.Root()) } // rootNode returns the Root Node of the filesystem. func (n *Node) rootNode() *RootNode { return n.Root().Operations().(*RootNode) } // prepareAtSyscall returns a (dirfd, cName) pair that can be used // with the "___at" family of system calls (openat, fstatat, unlinkat...) to // access the backing encrypted directory. // // If you pass a `child` file name, the (dirfd, cName) pair will refer to // a child of this node. // If `child` is empty, the (dirfd, cName) pair refers to this node itself. func (n *Node) prepareAtSyscall(child string) (dirfd int, pName string, errno syscall.Errno) { p := n.Path() if child != "" { p = filepath.Join(p, child) } rn := n.rootNode() dirfd, pName, err := rn.openBackingDir(p) if err != nil { errno = fs.ToErrno(err) } return } // newChild attaches a new child inode to n. // The passed-in `st` will be modified to get a unique inode number. func (n *Node) newChild(ctx context.Context, st *syscall.Stat_t, out *fuse.EntryOut) *fs.Inode { // Get unique inode number rn := n.rootNode() rn.inoMap.TranslateStat(st) out.Attr.FromStat(st) // Create child node id := fs.StableAttr{ Mode: uint32(st.Mode), Gen: 1, Ino: st.Ino, } node := &Node{} return n.NewInode(ctx, node, id) } // isRoot returns true if this node is the root node func (n *Node) isRoot() bool { rn := n.rootNode() return &rn.Node == n } func (n *Node) lookupLongnameName(ctx context.Context, nameFile string, out *fuse.EntryOut) (ch *fs.Inode, errno syscall.Errno) { dirfd, pName1, errno := n.prepareAtSyscall("") if errno != 0 { return } defer syscall.Close(dirfd) // Find the file the gocryptfs.longname.XYZ.name file belongs to in the // directory listing fd, err := syscallcompat.Openat(dirfd, pName1, syscall.O_RDONLY|syscall.O_DIRECTORY|syscall.O_NOFOLLOW, 0) if err != nil { errno = fs.ToErrno(err) return } diriv := pathiv.Derive(n.Path(), pathiv.PurposeDirIV) rn := n.rootNode() pName, cFullname, errno := rn.findLongnameParent(fd, diriv, nameFile) if errno != 0 { return } // Get attrs from parent file st, err := syscallcompat.Fstatat2(dirfd, pName, unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) if err != nil { errno = fs.ToErrno(err) return } var vf *VirtualMemNode vf, errno = n.newVirtualMemNode([]byte(cFullname), st, inoTagNameFile) if errno != 0 { return nil, errno } out.Attr = vf.attr // Create child node id := fs.StableAttr{Mode: uint32(vf.attr.Mode), Gen: 1, Ino: vf.attr.Ino} ch = n.NewInode(ctx, vf, id) return } // lookupDiriv returns a new Inode for a gocryptfs.diriv file inside `n`. func (n *Node) lookupDiriv(ctx context.Context, out *fuse.EntryOut) (ch *fs.Inode, errno syscall.Errno) { dirfd, pName, errno := n.prepareAtSyscall("") if errno != 0 { return } defer syscall.Close(dirfd) st, err := syscallcompat.Fstatat2(dirfd, pName, unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) if err != nil { errno = fs.ToErrno(err) return } content := pathiv.Derive(n.Path(), pathiv.PurposeDirIV) var vf *VirtualMemNode vf, errno = n.newVirtualMemNode(content, st, inoTagDirIV) if errno != 0 { return nil, errno } out.Attr = vf.attr // Create child node id := fs.StableAttr{Mode: uint32(vf.attr.Mode), Gen: 1, Ino: vf.attr.Ino} ch = n.NewInode(ctx, vf, id) return } // lookupConf returns a new Inode for the gocryptfs.conf file func (n *Node) lookupConf(ctx context.Context, out *fuse.EntryOut) (ch *fs.Inode, errno syscall.Errno) { rn := n.rootNode() p := filepath.Join(rn.args.Cipherdir, configfile.ConfReverseName) var st syscall.Stat_t err := syscall.Stat(p, &st) if err != nil { errno = fs.ToErrno(err) return } // Get unique inode number rn.inoMap.TranslateStat(&st) out.Attr.FromStat(&st) // Create child node id := fs.StableAttr{ Mode: uint32(st.Mode), Gen: 1, Ino: st.Ino, } node := &VirtualConfNode{path: p} ch = n.NewInode(ctx, node, id) return } // readlink reads and encrypts a symlink. Used by Readlink, Getattr, Lookup. func (n *Node) readlink(dirfd int, cName string, pName string) (out []byte, errno syscall.Errno) { plainTarget, err := syscallcompat.Readlinkat(dirfd, pName) if err != nil { errno = fs.ToErrno(err) return } rn := n.rootNode() if rn.args.PlaintextNames { return []byte(plainTarget), 0 } // Nonce is derived from the relative *ciphertext* path p := filepath.Join(n.Path(), cName) nonce := pathiv.Derive(p, pathiv.PurposeSymlinkIV) // Symlinks are encrypted like file contents and base64-encoded cBinTarget := rn.contentEnc.EncryptBlockNonce([]byte(plainTarget), 0, nil, nonce) cTarget := rn.nameTransform.B64EncodeToString(cBinTarget) // The kernel will reject a symlink target above 4096 chars and return // and I/O error to the user. Better emit the proper error ourselves. if len(cTarget) > syscallcompat.PATH_MAX { errno = syscall.ENAMETOOLONG return } return []byte(cTarget), 0 }