package fusefrontend_reverse import ( "encoding/base64" "path/filepath" "strings" "syscall" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/nametransform" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/pathiv" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/syscallcompat" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/tlog" ) // abs basically returns storage dir + "/" + relPath. // It takes an error parameter so it can directly wrap decryptPath like this: // a, err := rfs.abs(rfs.decryptPath(relPath)) // abs never generates an error on its own. In other words, abs(p, nil) never // fails. func (rfs *RootNode) abs(relPath string, err error) (string, error) { if err != nil { return "", err } return filepath.Join(rfs.args.Cipherdir, relPath), nil } // rDecryptName decrypts the ciphertext name "cName", given the dirIV of the // directory "cName" lies in. The relative plaintext path to the directory // "pDir" is used if a "gocryptfs.longname.XYZ.name" must be resolved. func (rfs *RootNode) rDecryptName(cName string, dirIV []byte, pDir string) (pName string, err error) { nameType := nametransform.NameType(cName) if nameType == nametransform.LongNameNone { pName, err = rfs.nameTransform.DecryptName(cName, dirIV) if err != nil { // We get lots of decrypt requests for names like ".Trash" that // are invalid base64. Convert them to ENOENT so the correct // error gets returned to the user. if _, ok := err.(base64.CorruptInputError); ok { return "", syscall.ENOENT } // Stat attempts on the link target of encrypted symlinks. // These are always valid base64 but the length is not a // multiple of 16. if err == syscall.EBADMSG { return "", syscall.ENOENT } return "", err } } else if nameType == nametransform.LongNameContent { panic("todo") //pName, err = rfs.findLongnameParent(pDir, dirIV, cName) if err != nil { return "", err } } else { // It makes no sense to decrypt a ".name" file. This is a virtual file // that has no representation in the plaintext filesystem. ".name" // files should have already been handled in virtualfile.go. tlog.Warn.Printf("rDecryptName: cannot decrypt virtual file %q", cName) return "", syscall.EINVAL } return pName, nil } // decryptPath decrypts a relative ciphertext path to a relative plaintext // path. func (rn *RootNode) decryptPath(relPath string) (string, error) { if rn.args.PlaintextNames || relPath == "" { return relPath, nil } parts := strings.Split(relPath, "/") var transformedParts []string for i := range parts { // Start at the top and recurse currentCipherDir := filepath.Join(parts[:i]...) currentPlainDir := filepath.Join(transformedParts[:i]...) dirIV := pathiv.Derive(currentCipherDir, pathiv.PurposeDirIV) transformedPart, err := rn.rDecryptName(parts[i], dirIV, currentPlainDir) if err != nil { return "", err } transformedParts = append(transformedParts, transformedPart) } pRelPath := filepath.Join(transformedParts...) return pRelPath, nil } // openBackingDir receives an already decrypted relative path // "pRelPath", opens the directory that contains the target file/dir // and returns the fd to the directory and the decrypted name of the // target file. The fd/name pair is intended for use with fchownat and // friends. func (rn *RootNode) openBackingDir(pRelPath string) (dirfd int, pName string, err error) { // Open directory, safe against symlink races pDir := filepath.Dir(pRelPath) dirfd, err = syscallcompat.OpenDirNofollow(rn.args.Cipherdir, pDir) if err != nil { return -1, "", err } pName = filepath.Base(pRelPath) return dirfd, pName, nil }