4764a9bde0
Mount flag only at the moment, not saved to gocryptfs.conf. https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/452
220 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
220 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
// Package cryptocore wraps OpenSSL and Go GCM crypto and provides
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// a nonce generator.
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package cryptocore
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import (
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/sha512"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"runtime"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
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"github.com/rfjakob/eme"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/internal/siv_aead"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/internal/stupidgcm"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/internal/tlog"
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)
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const (
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// KeyLen is the cipher key length in bytes. 32 for AES-256.
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KeyLen = 32
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// AuthTagLen is the length of a GCM auth tag in bytes.
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AuthTagLen = 16
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)
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// AEADTypeEnum indicates the type of AEAD backend in use.
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type AEADTypeEnum int
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const (
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// BackendOpenSSL specifies the OpenSSL backend.
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// "AES-GCM-256-OpenSSL" in gocryptfs -speed.
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BackendOpenSSL AEADTypeEnum = 3
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// BackendGoGCM specifies the Go based GCM backend.
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// "AES-GCM-256-Go" in gocryptfs -speed.
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BackendGoGCM AEADTypeEnum = 4
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// BackendAESSIV specifies an AESSIV backend.
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// "AES-SIV-512-Go" in gocryptfs -speed.
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BackendAESSIV AEADTypeEnum = 5
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// BackendXChaCha20Poly1305 specifies XChaCha20-Poly1305-Go.
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// "XChaCha20-Poly1305-Go" in gocryptfs -speed.
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BackendXChaCha20Poly1305 AEADTypeEnum = 6
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)
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func (a AEADTypeEnum) String() string {
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switch a {
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case BackendOpenSSL:
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return "BackendOpenSSL"
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case BackendGoGCM:
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return "BackendGoGCM"
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case BackendAESSIV:
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return "BackendAESSIV"
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default:
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return fmt.Sprintf("%d", a)
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}
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}
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// CryptoCore is the low level crypto implementation.
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type CryptoCore struct {
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// EME is used for filename encryption.
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EMECipher *eme.EMECipher
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// GCM or AES-SIV. This is used for content encryption.
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AEADCipher cipher.AEAD
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// Which backend is behind AEADCipher?
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AEADBackend AEADTypeEnum
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// GCM needs unique IVs (nonces)
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IVGenerator *nonceGenerator
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// IVLen in bytes
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IVLen int
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}
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// New returns a new CryptoCore object or panics.
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//
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// Even though the "GCMIV128" feature flag is now mandatory, we must still
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// support 96-bit IVs here because they were used for encrypting the master
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// key in gocryptfs.conf up to gocryptfs v1.2. v1.3 switched to 128 bits.
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//
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// Note: "key" is either the scrypt hash of the password (when decrypting
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// a config file) or the masterkey (when finally mounting the filesystem).
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func New(key []byte, aeadType AEADTypeEnum, IVBitLen int, useHKDF bool, forceDecode bool) *CryptoCore {
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tlog.Debug.Printf("cryptocore.New: key=%d bytes, aeadType=%v, IVBitLen=%d, useHKDF=%v, forceDecode=%v",
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len(key), aeadType, IVBitLen, useHKDF, forceDecode)
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if len(key) != KeyLen {
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log.Panicf("Unsupported key length of %d bytes", len(key))
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}
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if IVBitLen != 96 && IVBitLen != 128 && IVBitLen != chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX*8 {
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log.Panicf("Unsupported IV length of %d bits", IVBitLen)
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}
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// Initialize EME for filename encryption.
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var emeCipher *eme.EMECipher
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var err error
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{
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var emeBlockCipher cipher.Block
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if useHKDF {
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emeKey := hkdfDerive(key, hkdfInfoEMENames, KeyLen)
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emeBlockCipher, err = aes.NewCipher(emeKey)
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for i := range emeKey {
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emeKey[i] = 0
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}
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} else {
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emeBlockCipher, err = aes.NewCipher(key)
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}
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if err != nil {
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log.Panic(err)
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}
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emeCipher = eme.New(emeBlockCipher)
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}
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// Initialize an AEAD cipher for file content encryption.
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var aeadCipher cipher.AEAD
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if aeadType == BackendOpenSSL || aeadType == BackendGoGCM {
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var gcmKey []byte
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if useHKDF {
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gcmKey = hkdfDerive(key, hkdfInfoGCMContent, KeyLen)
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} else {
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// Filesystems created by gocryptfs v0.7 through v1.2 don't use HKDF.
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// Example: tests/example_filesystems/v0.9
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gcmKey = append([]byte{}, key...)
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}
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switch aeadType {
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case BackendOpenSSL:
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if IVBitLen != 128 {
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log.Panicf("stupidgcm only supports 128-bit IVs, you wanted %d", IVBitLen)
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}
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aeadCipher = stupidgcm.New(gcmKey, forceDecode)
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case BackendGoGCM:
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goGcmBlockCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(gcmKey)
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if err != nil {
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log.Panic(err)
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}
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aeadCipher, err = cipher.NewGCMWithNonceSize(goGcmBlockCipher, IVBitLen/8)
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if err != nil {
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log.Panic(err)
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}
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}
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for i := range gcmKey {
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gcmKey[i] = 0
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}
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} else if aeadType == BackendAESSIV {
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if IVBitLen != 128 {
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// SIV supports any nonce size, but we only use 128.
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log.Panicf("AES-SIV must use 128-bit IVs, you wanted %d", IVBitLen)
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}
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// AES-SIV uses 1/2 of the key for authentication, 1/2 for
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// encryption, so we need a 64-bytes key for AES-256. Derive it from
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// the 32-byte master key using HKDF, or, for older filesystems, with
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// SHA256.
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var key64 []byte
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if useHKDF {
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key64 = hkdfDerive(key, hkdfInfoSIVContent, siv_aead.KeyLen)
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} else {
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s := sha512.Sum512(key)
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key64 = s[:]
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}
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aeadCipher = siv_aead.New(key64)
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for i := range key64 {
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key64[i] = 0
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}
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} else if aeadType == BackendXChaCha20Poly1305 {
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// We don't support legacy modes with XChaCha20-Poly1305
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if IVBitLen != chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX*8 {
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log.Panicf("XChaCha20-Poly1305 must use 192-bit IVs, you wanted %d", IVBitLen)
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}
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if !useHKDF {
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log.Panic("XChaCha20-Poly1305 must use HKDF, but it is disabled")
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}
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derivedKey := hkdfDerive(key, hkdfInfoXChaChaPoly1305Content, chacha20poly1305.KeySize)
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aeadCipher, err = chacha20poly1305.NewX(derivedKey)
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if err != nil {
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log.Panic(err)
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}
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} else {
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log.Panicf("unknown cipher backend %q", aeadType.String())
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}
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if aeadCipher.NonceSize()*8 != IVBitLen {
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log.Panicf("Mismatched aeadCipher.NonceSize*8=%d and IVBitLen=%d bits",
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aeadCipher.NonceSize()*8, IVBitLen)
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}
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return &CryptoCore{
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EMECipher: emeCipher,
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AEADCipher: aeadCipher,
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AEADBackend: aeadType,
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IVGenerator: &nonceGenerator{nonceLen: IVBitLen / 8},
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IVLen: IVBitLen / 8,
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}
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}
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type wiper interface {
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Wipe()
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}
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// Wipe tries to wipe secret keys from memory by overwriting them with zeros
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// and/or setting references to nil.
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//
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// This is not bulletproof due to possible GC copies, but
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// still raises to bar for extracting the key.
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func (c *CryptoCore) Wipe() {
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be := c.AEADBackend
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if be == BackendOpenSSL || be == BackendAESSIV {
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tlog.Debug.Printf("CryptoCore.Wipe: Wiping AEADBackend %d key", be)
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// We don't use "x, ok :=" because we *want* to crash loudly if the
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// type assertion fails.
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w := c.AEADCipher.(wiper)
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w.Wipe()
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} else {
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tlog.Debug.Printf("CryptoCore.Wipe: Only nil'ing stdlib refs")
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}
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// We have no access to the keys (or key-equivalents) stored inside the
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// Go stdlib. Best we can is to nil the references and force a GC.
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c.AEADCipher = nil
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c.EMECipher = nil
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runtime.GC()
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}
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