232 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
232 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
package fusefrontend_reverse
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import (
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"context"
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"path/filepath"
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"syscall"
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"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
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"github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2/fs"
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"github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2/fuse"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/configfile"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/pathiv"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/syscallcompat"
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)
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const (
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// File names are padded to 16-byte multiples, encrypted and
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// base64-encoded. We can encode at most 176 bytes to stay below the 255
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// bytes limit:
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// * base64(176 bytes) = 235 bytes
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// * base64(192 bytes) = 256 bytes (over 255!)
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// But the PKCS#7 padding is at least one byte. This means we can only use
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// 175 bytes for the file name.
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shortNameMax = 175
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)
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// translateSize translates the ciphertext size in `out` into plaintext size.
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func (n *Node) translateSize(dirfd int, cName string, pName string, out *fuse.Attr) {
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if out.IsRegular() {
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rn := n.rootNode()
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out.Size = rn.contentEnc.PlainSizeToCipherSize(out.Size)
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} else if out.IsSymlink() {
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cLink, _ := n.readlink(dirfd, cName, pName)
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out.Size = uint64(len(cLink))
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}
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}
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// Path returns the relative plaintext path of this node
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func (n *Node) Path() string {
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return n.Inode.Path(n.Root())
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}
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// rootNode returns the Root Node of the filesystem.
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func (n *Node) rootNode() *RootNode {
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return n.Root().Operations().(*RootNode)
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}
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// dirfdPlus gets filled out as we gather information about a node
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type dirfdPlus struct {
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// fd to the directory, opened with O_DIRECTORY|O_PATH
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dirfd int
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// Relative plaintext path
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pPath string
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// Plaintext basename: filepath.Base(pPath)
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pName string
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// Relative ciphertext path
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cPath string
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// Ciphertext basename: filepath.Base(cPath)
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cName string
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}
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// prepareAtSyscall returns a (dirfd, cName) pair that can be used
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// with the "___at" family of system calls (openat, fstatat, unlinkat...) to
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// access the backing encrypted directory.
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//
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// If you pass a `child` file name, the (dirfd, cName) pair will refer to
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// a child of this node.
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// If `child` is empty, the (dirfd, cName) pair refers to this node itself.
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func (n *Node) prepareAtSyscall(child string) (d *dirfdPlus, errno syscall.Errno) {
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cPath := n.Path()
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if child != "" {
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cPath = filepath.Join(cPath, child)
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}
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rn := n.rootNode()
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dirfd, pPath, err := rn.openBackingDir(cPath)
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if err != nil {
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errno = fs.ToErrno(err)
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}
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d = &dirfdPlus{
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dirfd: dirfd,
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pPath: pPath,
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pName: filepath.Base(pPath),
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cPath: cPath,
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cName: filepath.Base(cPath),
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}
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return
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}
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// newChild attaches a new child inode to n.
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// The passed-in `st` will be modified to get a unique inode number.
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func (n *Node) newChild(ctx context.Context, st *syscall.Stat_t, out *fuse.EntryOut) *fs.Inode {
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// Get unique inode number
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rn := n.rootNode()
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rn.inoMap.TranslateStat(st)
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out.Attr.FromStat(st)
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// Create child node
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id := fs.StableAttr{
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Mode: uint32(st.Mode),
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Gen: 1,
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Ino: st.Ino,
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}
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node := &Node{}
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return n.NewInode(ctx, node, id)
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}
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// isRoot returns true if this node is the root node
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func (n *Node) isRoot() bool {
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rn := n.rootNode()
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return &rn.Node == n
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}
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func (n *Node) lookupLongnameName(ctx context.Context, nameFile string, out *fuse.EntryOut) (ch *fs.Inode, errno syscall.Errno) {
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d, errno := n.prepareAtSyscall("")
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if errno != 0 {
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return
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}
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defer syscall.Close(d.dirfd)
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// Find the file the gocryptfs.longname.XYZ.name file belongs to in the
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// directory listing
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fd, err := syscallcompat.Openat(d.dirfd, d.pName, syscall.O_RDONLY|syscall.O_DIRECTORY|syscall.O_NOFOLLOW, 0)
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if err != nil {
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errno = fs.ToErrno(err)
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return
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}
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defer syscall.Close(fd)
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diriv := pathiv.Derive(d.cPath, pathiv.PurposeDirIV)
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rn := n.rootNode()
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pName, cFullname, errno := rn.findLongnameParent(fd, diriv, nameFile)
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if errno != 0 {
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return
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}
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if rn.isExcludedPlain(filepath.Join(d.cPath, pName)) {
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errno = syscall.EPERM
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return
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}
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// Get attrs from parent file
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st, err := syscallcompat.Fstatat2(fd, pName, unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
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if err != nil {
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errno = fs.ToErrno(err)
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return
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}
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var vf *VirtualMemNode
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vf, errno = n.newVirtualMemNode([]byte(cFullname), st, inoTagNameFile)
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if errno != 0 {
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return nil, errno
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}
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out.Attr = vf.attr
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// Create child node
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id := fs.StableAttr{Mode: uint32(vf.attr.Mode), Gen: 1, Ino: vf.attr.Ino}
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ch = n.NewInode(ctx, vf, id)
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return
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}
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// lookupDiriv returns a new Inode for a gocryptfs.diriv file inside `n`.
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func (n *Node) lookupDiriv(ctx context.Context, out *fuse.EntryOut) (ch *fs.Inode, errno syscall.Errno) {
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d, errno := n.prepareAtSyscall("")
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if errno != 0 {
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return
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}
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defer syscall.Close(d.dirfd)
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st, err := syscallcompat.Fstatat2(d.dirfd, d.pName, unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
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if err != nil {
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errno = fs.ToErrno(err)
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return
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}
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content := pathiv.Derive(d.cPath, pathiv.PurposeDirIV)
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var vf *VirtualMemNode
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vf, errno = n.newVirtualMemNode(content, st, inoTagDirIV)
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if errno != 0 {
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return nil, errno
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}
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out.Attr = vf.attr
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// Create child node
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id := fs.StableAttr{Mode: uint32(vf.attr.Mode), Gen: 1, Ino: vf.attr.Ino}
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ch = n.NewInode(ctx, vf, id)
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return
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}
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// lookupConf returns a new Inode for the gocryptfs.conf file
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func (n *Node) lookupConf(ctx context.Context, out *fuse.EntryOut) (ch *fs.Inode, errno syscall.Errno) {
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rn := n.rootNode()
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p := filepath.Join(rn.args.Cipherdir, configfile.ConfReverseName)
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var st syscall.Stat_t
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err := syscall.Stat(p, &st)
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if err != nil {
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errno = fs.ToErrno(err)
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return
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}
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// Get unique inode number
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rn.inoMap.TranslateStat(&st)
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out.Attr.FromStat(&st)
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// Create child node
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id := fs.StableAttr{
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Mode: uint32(st.Mode),
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Gen: 1,
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Ino: st.Ino,
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}
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node := &VirtualConfNode{path: p}
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ch = n.NewInode(ctx, node, id)
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return
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}
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// readlink reads and encrypts a symlink. Used by Readlink, Getattr, Lookup.
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func (n *Node) readlink(dirfd int, cName string, pName string) (out []byte, errno syscall.Errno) {
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plainTarget, err := syscallcompat.Readlinkat(dirfd, pName)
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if err != nil {
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errno = fs.ToErrno(err)
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return
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}
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rn := n.rootNode()
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if rn.args.PlaintextNames {
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return []byte(plainTarget), 0
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}
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// Nonce is derived from the relative *ciphertext* path
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p := filepath.Join(n.Path(), cName)
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nonce := pathiv.Derive(p, pathiv.PurposeSymlinkIV)
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// Symlinks are encrypted like file contents and base64-encoded
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cBinTarget := rn.contentEnc.EncryptBlockNonce([]byte(plainTarget), 0, nil, nonce)
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cTarget := rn.nameTransform.B64EncodeToString(cBinTarget)
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// The kernel will reject a symlink target above 4096 chars and return
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// and I/O error to the user. Better emit the proper error ourselves.
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if len(cTarget) > syscallcompat.PATH_MAX {
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errno = syscall.ENAMETOOLONG
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return
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}
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return []byte(cTarget), 0
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}
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