ec74d1d2f4
We need
fd7328faf9
to fix a crash reported in https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/430 :
2019/10/30 17:14:16 Unknown opcode 2016
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x20 pc=0x508d38]
This patch is only in the v2.x.x branch. Upgrade to v2, as the
old API is also supported there.
Running
git grep hanwen/go-fuse | grep -v hanwen/go-fuse/v2
to check for forgotten references comes back clean.
486 lines
14 KiB
Go
486 lines
14 KiB
Go
package fusefrontend_reverse
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import (
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"fmt"
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"path/filepath"
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"syscall"
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"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
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"github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2/fuse"
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"github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2/fuse/nodefs"
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"github.com/hanwen/go-fuse/v2/fuse/pathfs"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/configfile"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/contentenc"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/cryptocore"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/inomap"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/nametransform"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/pathiv"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/syscallcompat"
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"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/tlog"
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"github.com/sabhiram/go-gitignore"
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)
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// ReverseFS implements the pathfs.FileSystem interface and provides an
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// encrypted view of a plaintext directory.
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type ReverseFS struct {
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// Embed pathfs.defaultFileSystem for a ENOSYS implementation of all methods
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pathfs.FileSystem
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// pathfs.loopbackFileSystem, see go-fuse/fuse/pathfs/loopback.go
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loopbackfs pathfs.FileSystem
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// Stores configuration arguments
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args fusefrontend.Args
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// Filename encryption helper
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nameTransform nametransform.NameTransformer
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// Content encryption helper
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contentEnc *contentenc.ContentEnc
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// Tests whether a path is excluded (hiden) from the user. Used by -exclude.
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excluder ignore.IgnoreParser
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// inoMap translates inode numbers from different devices to unique inode
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// numbers.
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inoMap *inomap.InoMap
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}
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var _ pathfs.FileSystem = &ReverseFS{}
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// NewFS returns an encrypted FUSE overlay filesystem.
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// In this case (reverse mode) the backing directory is plain-text and
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// ReverseFS provides an encrypted view.
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func NewFS(args fusefrontend.Args, c *contentenc.ContentEnc, n nametransform.NameTransformer) *ReverseFS {
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initLongnameCache()
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fs := &ReverseFS{
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// pathfs.defaultFileSystem returns ENOSYS for all operations
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FileSystem: pathfs.NewDefaultFileSystem(),
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loopbackfs: pathfs.NewLoopbackFileSystem(args.Cipherdir),
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args: args,
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nameTransform: n,
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contentEnc: c,
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inoMap: inomap.New(),
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}
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fs.prepareExcluder(args)
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return fs
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}
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// relDir is identical to filepath.Dir excepts that it returns "" when
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// filepath.Dir would return ".".
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// In the FUSE API, the root directory is called "", and we actually want that.
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func relDir(path string) string {
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dir := filepath.Dir(path)
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if dir == "." {
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return ""
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}
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return dir
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}
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// getFileInfo returns information on a ciphertext path "relPath":
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// - ftype: file type (as returned by getFileType)
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// - excluded: if the path is excluded
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// - pPath: if it's not a special file, the decrypted path
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// - err: non nil if any error happens
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) getFileInfo(relPath string) (ftype fileType, excluded bool, pPath string, err error) {
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ftype = rfs.getFileType(relPath)
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if ftype == typeConfig {
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excluded, pPath, err = false, "", nil
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return
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}
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if ftype == typeDiriv {
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parentDir := nametransform.Dir(relPath)
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_, excluded, _, err = rfs.getFileInfo(parentDir)
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pPath = ""
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return
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}
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if ftype == typeName {
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parentDir := nametransform.Dir(relPath)
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var parentExcluded bool
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_, parentExcluded, _, err = rfs.getFileInfo(parentDir)
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if parentExcluded || err != nil {
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excluded, pPath = parentExcluded, ""
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return
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}
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relPath = nametransform.RemoveLongNameSuffix(relPath)
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}
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pPath, err = rfs.decryptPath(relPath)
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excluded = err == nil && rfs.isExcludedPlain(pPath)
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return
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}
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type fileType int
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// Values returned by getFileType
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const (
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// A regular file/directory/symlink
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typeRegular fileType = iota
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// A DirIV (gocryptfs.diriv) file
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typeDiriv
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// A .name file for a file with a long name
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typeName
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// The config file
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typeConfig
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)
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// getFileType returns the type of file. Only the name is checked
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) getFileType(cPath string) fileType {
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if rfs.isDirIV(cPath) {
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return typeDiriv
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}
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if rfs.isNameFile(cPath) {
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return typeName
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}
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if rfs.isTranslatedConfig(cPath) {
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return typeConfig
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}
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return typeRegular
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}
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// isDirIV determines if the path points to a gocryptfs.diriv file
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) isDirIV(relPath string) bool {
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if rfs.args.PlaintextNames {
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return false
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}
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return filepath.Base(relPath) == nametransform.DirIVFilename
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}
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// isNameFile determines if the path points to a gocryptfs.longname.*.name
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// file
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) isNameFile(relPath string) bool {
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if rfs.args.PlaintextNames {
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return false
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}
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fileType := nametransform.NameType(filepath.Base(relPath))
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return fileType == nametransform.LongNameFilename
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}
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// isTranslatedConfig returns true if the default config file name is in use
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// and the ciphertext path is "gocryptfs.conf".
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// "gocryptfs.conf" then maps to ".gocryptfs.reverse.conf" in the plaintext
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// directory.
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) isTranslatedConfig(relPath string) bool {
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if rfs.args.ConfigCustom {
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return false
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}
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if relPath == configfile.ConfDefaultName {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// GetAttr - FUSE call
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// "relPath" is the relative ciphertext path
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) GetAttr(relPath string, context *fuse.Context) (*fuse.Attr, fuse.Status) {
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ftype, excluded, pPath, err := rfs.getFileInfo(relPath)
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if excluded {
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return nil, fuse.ENOENT
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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// Handle "gocryptfs.conf"
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if ftype == typeConfig {
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absConfPath, _ := rfs.abs(configfile.ConfReverseName, nil)
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var st syscall.Stat_t
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err = syscall.Lstat(absConfPath, &st)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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rfs.inoMap.TranslateStat(&st)
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var a fuse.Attr
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a.FromStat(&st)
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if rfs.args.ForceOwner != nil {
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a.Owner = *rfs.args.ForceOwner
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}
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return &a, fuse.OK
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}
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// Handle virtual files (gocryptfs.diriv, *.name)
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var f nodefs.File
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var status fuse.Status
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virtual := false
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if ftype == typeDiriv {
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virtual = true
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f, status = rfs.newDirIVFile(relPath)
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}
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if ftype == typeName {
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virtual = true
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f, status = rfs.newNameFile(relPath)
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}
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if virtual {
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if !status.Ok() {
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tlog.Warn.Printf("GetAttr %q: newXFile failed: %v\n", relPath, status)
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return nil, status
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}
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var a fuse.Attr
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status = f.GetAttr(&a)
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if rfs.args.ForceOwner != nil {
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a.Owner = *rfs.args.ForceOwner
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}
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return &a, status
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}
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// Normal file / directory
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dirfd, name, err := rfs.openBackingDir(pPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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// Stat the backing file/dir using Fstatat
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var st syscall.Stat_t
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{
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var st2 unix.Stat_t
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err = syscallcompat.Fstatat(dirfd, name, &st2, unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
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syscall.Close(dirfd)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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st = syscallcompat.Unix2syscall(st2)
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}
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rfs.inoMap.TranslateStat(&st)
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var a fuse.Attr
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a.FromStat(&st)
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// Calculate encrypted file size
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if a.IsRegular() {
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a.Size = rfs.contentEnc.PlainSizeToCipherSize(a.Size)
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} else if a.IsSymlink() {
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var linkTarget string
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var readlinkStatus fuse.Status
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linkTarget, readlinkStatus = rfs.Readlink(relPath, context)
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if !readlinkStatus.Ok() {
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return nil, readlinkStatus
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}
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a.Size = uint64(len(linkTarget))
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}
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if rfs.args.ForceOwner != nil {
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a.Owner = *rfs.args.ForceOwner
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}
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return &a, fuse.OK
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}
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// Access - FUSE call
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) Access(relPath string, mode uint32, context *fuse.Context) fuse.Status {
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ftype, excluded, pPath, err := rfs.getFileInfo(relPath)
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if excluded {
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return fuse.ENOENT
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}
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if err != nil {
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return fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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if ftype != typeRegular {
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// access(2) R_OK flag for checking if the file is readable, always 4 as defined in POSIX.
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ROK := uint32(0x4)
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// Virtual files can always be read and never written
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if mode == ROK || mode == 0 {
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return fuse.OK
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}
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return fuse.EPERM
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}
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dirfd, name, err := rfs.openBackingDir(pPath)
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if err != nil {
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return fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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err = syscallcompat.Faccessat(dirfd, name, mode)
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syscall.Close(dirfd)
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return fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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// Open - FUSE call
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) Open(relPath string, flags uint32, context *fuse.Context) (fuseFile nodefs.File, status fuse.Status) {
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ftype, excluded, pPath, err := rfs.getFileInfo(relPath)
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if excluded {
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return nil, fuse.ENOENT
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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if ftype == typeConfig {
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return rfs.loopbackfs.Open(configfile.ConfReverseName, flags, context)
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}
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if ftype == typeDiriv {
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return rfs.newDirIVFile(relPath)
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}
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if ftype == typeName {
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return rfs.newNameFile(relPath)
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}
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return rfs.newFile(relPath, pPath)
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}
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) openDirPlaintextnames(relPath string, entries []fuse.DirEntry) ([]fuse.DirEntry, fuse.Status) {
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if relPath != "" || rfs.args.ConfigCustom {
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return entries, fuse.OK
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}
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// We are in the root dir and the default config file name
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// ".gocryptfs.reverse.conf" is used. We map it to "gocryptfs.conf".
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dupe := -1
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status := fuse.OK
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for i := range entries {
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if entries[i].Name == configfile.ConfReverseName {
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entries[i].Name = configfile.ConfDefaultName
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} else if entries[i].Name == configfile.ConfDefaultName {
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dupe = i
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}
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}
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if dupe >= 0 {
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// Warn the user loudly: The gocryptfs.conf_NAME_COLLISION file will
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// throw ENOENT errors that are hard to miss.
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tlog.Warn.Printf("The file %q is mapped to %q and shadows another file. Please rename %q in directory %q.",
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configfile.ConfReverseName, configfile.ConfDefaultName, configfile.ConfDefaultName, rfs.args.Cipherdir)
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entries[dupe].Name = "gocryptfs.conf_NAME_COLLISION_" + fmt.Sprintf("%d", cryptocore.RandUint64())
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}
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return entries, status
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}
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// OpenDir - FUSE readdir call
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) OpenDir(cipherPath string, context *fuse.Context) ([]fuse.DirEntry, fuse.Status) {
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ftype, excluded, relPath, err := rfs.getFileInfo(cipherPath)
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if excluded {
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return nil, fuse.ENOENT
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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if ftype != typeRegular {
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return nil, fuse.ENOTDIR
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}
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// Read plaintext dir
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dirfd, err := syscallcompat.OpenDirNofollow(rfs.args.Cipherdir, filepath.Dir(relPath))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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fd, err := syscallcompat.Openat(dirfd, filepath.Base(relPath), syscall.O_RDONLY|syscall.O_DIRECTORY|syscall.O_NOFOLLOW, 0)
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syscall.Close(dirfd)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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entries, err := syscallcompat.Getdents(fd)
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syscall.Close(fd)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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if rfs.args.PlaintextNames {
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var status fuse.Status
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entries, status = rfs.openDirPlaintextnames(cipherPath, entries)
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if !status.Ok() {
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return nil, status
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}
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entries = rfs.excludeDirEntries(relPath, entries)
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return entries, fuse.OK
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}
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// Filter out excluded entries
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entries = rfs.excludeDirEntries(relPath, entries)
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// Allocate maximum possible number of virtual files.
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// If all files have long names we need a virtual ".name" file for each,
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// plus one for gocryptfs.diriv.
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virtualFiles := make([]fuse.DirEntry, len(entries)+1)
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// Virtual gocryptfs.diriv file
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virtualFiles[0] = fuse.DirEntry{
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Mode: virtualFileMode,
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Name: nametransform.DirIVFilename,
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}
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// Actually used entries
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nVirtual := 1
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// Encrypt names
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dirIV := pathiv.Derive(cipherPath, pathiv.PurposeDirIV)
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for i := range entries {
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var cName string
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// ".gocryptfs.reverse.conf" in the root directory is mapped to "gocryptfs.conf"
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if cipherPath == "" && entries[i].Name == configfile.ConfReverseName &&
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!rfs.args.ConfigCustom {
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cName = configfile.ConfDefaultName
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} else {
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cName = rfs.nameTransform.EncryptName(entries[i].Name, dirIV)
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if len(cName) > unix.NAME_MAX {
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cName = rfs.nameTransform.HashLongName(cName)
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dotNameFile := fuse.DirEntry{
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Mode: virtualFileMode,
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Name: cName + nametransform.LongNameSuffix,
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}
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virtualFiles[nVirtual] = dotNameFile
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nVirtual++
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}
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}
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entries[i].Name = cName
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}
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// Add virtual files
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entries = append(entries, virtualFiles[:nVirtual]...)
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return entries, fuse.OK
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}
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// excludeDirEntries filters out directory entries that are "-exclude"d.
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// pDir is the relative plaintext path to the directory these entries are
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// from. The entries should be plaintext files.
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) excludeDirEntries(pDir string, entries []fuse.DirEntry) (filtered []fuse.DirEntry) {
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if rfs.excluder == nil {
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return entries
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}
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filtered = make([]fuse.DirEntry, 0, len(entries))
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for _, entry := range entries {
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// filepath.Join handles the case of pDir="" correctly:
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// Join("", "foo") -> "foo". This does not: pDir + "/" + name"
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p := filepath.Join(pDir, entry.Name)
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if rfs.isExcludedPlain(p) {
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// Skip file
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continue
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}
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filtered = append(filtered, entry)
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}
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return filtered
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}
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// StatFs - FUSE call. Returns information about the filesystem (free space
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// etc).
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// Securing statfs against symlink races seems to be more trouble than
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// it's worth, so we just ignore the path and always return info about the
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// backing storage root dir.
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) StatFs(relPath string) *fuse.StatfsOut {
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_, excluded, _, err := rfs.getFileInfo(relPath)
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if excluded || err != nil {
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return nil
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}
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var s syscall.Statfs_t
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err = syscall.Statfs(rfs.args.Cipherdir, &s)
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if err != nil {
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return nil
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}
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out := &fuse.StatfsOut{}
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out.FromStatfsT(&s)
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return out
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}
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// Readlink - FUSE call
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func (rfs *ReverseFS) Readlink(relPath string, context *fuse.Context) (string, fuse.Status) {
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ftype, excluded, pPath, err := rfs.getFileInfo(relPath)
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if excluded {
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return "", fuse.ENOENT
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}
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if err != nil {
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return "", fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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if ftype != typeRegular {
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return "", fuse.EINVAL
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}
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dirfd, name, err := rfs.openBackingDir(pPath)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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// read the link target using Readlinkat
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plainTarget, err := syscallcompat.Readlinkat(dirfd, name)
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syscall.Close(dirfd)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fuse.ToStatus(err)
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}
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if rfs.args.PlaintextNames {
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return plainTarget, fuse.OK
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}
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nonce := pathiv.Derive(relPath, pathiv.PurposeSymlinkIV)
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// Symlinks are encrypted like file contents and base64-encoded
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cBinTarget := rfs.contentEnc.EncryptBlockNonce([]byte(plainTarget), 0, nil, nonce)
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cTarget := rfs.nameTransform.B64EncodeToString(cBinTarget)
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// The kernel will reject a symlink target above 4096 chars and return
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// and I/O error to the user. Better emit the proper error ourselves.
|
|
if len(cTarget) > syscallcompat.PATH_MAX {
|
|
return "", fuse.Status(syscall.ENAMETOOLONG)
|
|
}
|
|
return cTarget, fuse.OK
|
|
}
|