Adaptation of the original PdfViewer app to work as a library (fork of https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer)
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octocorvus bfb5e4a538 fix file size parsing issue causing crash
Opening a PDF using Storage Access Framework (SAF) causes the app to
crash in some cases, when the file is not present on the device's
internal storage (for example, on Proton Drive).
2023-06-28 00:12:28 -04:00
.github drop legacy GitHub Actions submodule checkout 2023-04-10 01:33:57 -04:00
app fix file size parsing issue causing crash 2023-06-28 00:12:28 -04:00
gradle drop unnecessary com.android.library plugin 2023-05-03 12:59:30 -04:00
.eslintrc.json add eslint config and missing semicolons 2023-06-09 11:33:53 -04:00
.gitignore migrate to pdfjs-dist npm package 2023-03-24 19:45:49 -04:00
build.gradle.kts drop unnecessary com.android.library plugin 2023-05-03 12:59:30 -04:00
gradle.properties update Android Gradle Plugin to 8.0.0 2023-04-14 08:37:42 -04:00
gradlew Update Gradle to 8.1 2023-04-12 12:57:17 -04:00
gradlew.bat update Gradle to 7.6 2022-12-09 08:48:17 -05:00
LICENSE update copyright notice 2023-02-01 23:37:39 -05:00
package-lock.json Bump eslint from 8.42.0 to 8.43.0 2023-06-16 18:23:52 -04:00
package.json Bump eslint from 8.42.0 to 8.43.0 2023-06-16 18:23:52 -04:00
PDFJS_LICENSE initial commit with overhauled / rebranded project 2019-06-27 23:22:08 -04:00
README.md add README based on release notes 2020-05-27 19:11:43 -04:00
settings.gradle.kts Update Gradle build scripts 2023-05-03 12:58:19 -04:00
setup add setup script 2023-03-24 19:46:52 -04:00

Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.