Adaptation of the original PdfViewer app to work as a library (fork of https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer)
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2023-09-16 04:20:38 -04:00
.github Bump actions/checkout from 3 to 4 2023-09-05 03:37:57 -04:00
app build: hook viewer build tasks to gradle 2023-09-16 04:20:38 -04:00
gradle update Android Gradle plugin to 8.1.1 2023-08-25 18:30:27 -04:00
viewer viewer: replace window with globalThis 2023-09-16 04:20:38 -04:00
.eslintrc.json viewer: use esbuild to bundle pdf viewer and worker 2023-09-16 04:20:38 -04:00
.gitignore viewer: use esbuild to bundle pdf viewer and worker 2023-09-16 04:20:38 -04:00
build.gradle.kts update Android Gradle plugin to 8.1.1 2023-08-25 18:30:27 -04:00
gradle.properties update Android Gradle Plugin to 8.0.0 2023-04-14 08:37:42 -04:00
gradlew update Gradle to 8.3 2023-08-17 13:00:29 -04:00
gradlew.bat update Gradle to 7.6 2022-12-09 08:48:17 -05:00
LICENSE update copyright notice 2023-02-01 23:37:39 -05:00
package-lock.json viewer: use esbuild to bundle pdf viewer and worker 2023-09-16 04:20:38 -04:00
package.json viewer: use esbuild to bundle pdf viewer and worker 2023-09-16 04:20:38 -04:00
PDFJS_LICENSE initial commit with overhauled / rebranded project 2019-06-27 23:22:08 -04:00
process_static.js viewer: use esbuild to bundle pdf viewer and worker 2023-09-16 04:20:38 -04:00
README.md add README based on release notes 2020-05-27 19:11:43 -04:00
settings.gradle.kts Update Gradle build scripts 2023-05-03 12:58:19 -04:00
setup add setup script 2023-03-24 19:46:52 -04:00

Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.