Adaptation of the original PdfViewer app to work as a library (fork of https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer)
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dependabot[bot] e161b71d22 Bump pdfjs-dist from 3.4.120 to 3.5.141
Bumps [pdfjs-dist](https://github.com/mozilla/pdfjs-dist) from 3.4.120 to 3.5.141.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/mozilla/pdfjs-dist/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/mozilla/pdfjs-dist/commits)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: pdfjs-dist
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2023-04-09 10:40:16 -04:00
.github update GitHub workflow to install npm dependencies 2023-03-24 19:45:49 -04:00
app bugfix: make text layer position absolute and use CSS transform to al... 2023-04-09 09:32:58 -04:00
gradle update Kotlin to 1.8.20 2023-04-09 09:34:51 -04:00
.gitignore migrate to pdfjs-dist npm package 2023-03-24 19:45:49 -04:00
build.gradle.kts update Kotlin to 1.8.20 2023-04-09 09:34:51 -04:00
gradle.properties disable obsolete jetifier 2021-11-21 16:55:27 -05:00
gradlew update Gradle to 8.0.1 2023-02-24 15:37:12 -05:00
gradlew.bat update Gradle to 7.6 2022-12-09 08:48:17 -05:00
LICENSE update copyright notice 2023-02-01 23:37:39 -05:00
package-lock.json Bump pdfjs-dist from 3.4.120 to 3.5.141 2023-04-09 10:40:16 -04:00
package.json Bump pdfjs-dist from 3.4.120 to 3.5.141 2023-04-09 10:40:16 -04:00
PDFJS_LICENSE initial commit with overhauled / rebranded project 2019-06-27 23:22:08 -04:00
README.md add README based on release notes 2020-05-27 19:11:43 -04:00
settings.gradle.kts use Gradle Kotlin DSL 2021-11-21 15:10:47 -05:00
setup add setup script 2023-03-24 19:46:52 -04:00

Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.