It literally cannot hurt [1], and makes it easier for users to use custom mode with TCP/dFPI. Turning on socialtracking helps gain parity with strict mode
[1] gorhill: https://old.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/l7xetb/network_priority_for_firefoxs_enhanced_tracking/gl9rn9n/
> All extensions and ETP work in parallel, they all inspect network requests and all make the decision to block or not, hence if they all decide to block, they will all report that they block something. ETP is a bit different than normal extension in that it will give precedence to an extension trying to redirect to a local resource, this ensures ETP works harmoniously with normal extensions.
>
> Once something is not blocked, it then goes through a DNS query, and the browser waits for the response.
>
> I will add examples of how ETP + multiple blocker extensions work together when dealing with a network request; let's say "A" and "B" are two different blockers:
>
> - ETP=block, A=allow, B=allow: result=block
> - ETP=allow, A=block, B=allow: result=block
> - ETP=allow, A=allow, B=redirect: result=redirect
> - ETP=allow, A=block, B=redirect: result=block
> - ETP=block, A=allow, B=redirect: result=redirect
>
> So as you can see, ETP is a bit different than a normal extension in that it won't prevent redirection from happening if ever a network request is redirected by one of the normal extension.
It is simpler to leave the PointerEvent pref where it is, until ESR78 is EOL
- FF87+ users who use RFP Alts simply add a dead pref, no harm
- This way ESR78 users don't have to worry about extra char flipping: it's the same as before: 1 flip for ESR, 1 flip for RFP Alts
only stable is false, at the time of writing. but enforcing this for all channels is good, so no-one ends up wasting mozilla resources reporting a compat problem when they've got 200 odd prefs flipped
- don't differentiate between channels
- both can be made inactive
- webcompat requires user action: and I don't see this as a bad thing to have in non-stable
- unsubmitted crashReports on Nightly is probably already covered by killing the URL, so no big deal
- 0000: remove old XUL info, dropped in FF73+
- 0201: save 3 chars
- 0350: add default status for unsubmittedCheck
- 0351: change to enforce: has been default false going back to at least FF60, including current Beta/Dev/Nightly
- along with 0602 `network.dns.disablePrefetchFromHTTPS` and 0603 `network.predictor.enable-prefetch`, I considered making them inactive, but decided it was good to leave them active for non-stable users just in case they get flipped
- 0515: add default status
- 0850c: remove info: out of date: doesn't work lilke that anymore and can't be assed figuring it out what with megabar and urlbar2 changes
- 0871: make inactive: default false since at least FF60
- no need to enforce for non-stable in case it is flipped. It's a pretty minor shoulder-surfer privacy issue and the previews are small. If you're not sure what this pref does. On false you get one tab shown, on true you get as many as can fit across your screen. I squeezed in 15, and after that it became a list
- fixup `***/`
- shave off six lines and almost 400 bytes for you bastards
- This is too minimal to be of any use, breaks too much (e.g. zoom video)
- Tor browser stopped flipping this (I *think*) about 5 years ago: it certainly hasn't been used in ESR60+ based TB builds, I checked
- we already disable webgl, so making this inactive removes yet another pref users need to flip/troubleshoot
- I will leave it in the user js for a few releases so prefsCleaner will pick it up
- It is controlled in both runtime and via user.js by the state of `media.eme.enabled`. Also, who cares about the vis of a ui option
- note, there is no need to add this to the removed scratchpad list
- remove useless `see` word for reference links
- fixup 0701
- "do not play nice" is not measurable
- don't reference to self as a source: people can just search "VPN leak Ipv6" or something
- shrink and remove outdated info from section 0300 header
- combine some bugzillas
- drop some references
- 1647829 for HTTPS-Only mode
- hardware metrics: not going to implicitly encourage users to use this pref or tell them what sizes to use
- update [STATS]
- also remove TLS [STATS].. stats on TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are irrelevant: the default is now TLS 1.2+
- single CRLite reference for all blog articles
- save 588 bytes so all you bastards can theoretically load Firefox just that tiny bit faster
Note
- this is not the same as 2517 which disables the API
- RFP does not determine what is supported or not supported: so that entropy remains
- with or without RFP, if the media config is not supported it returns false,false (so there is nothing to spoof here)
* misc
- cleanup of old release notation in comments: e.g. if it's not applicable to ESR78+
- same with default version info
- simplify and save bytes on section 4700
- update 4500 header
- and unify the message about using extensions as counterproductive
- letterboxing
- provide info on stepped ranged (and drop crap about FF67)
- don't judge users who dislike seeing margins (I don't like them either, but I force my window to exact dimensions and stay there)
- screenshots uploading was disabled in FF67+ : [67 release notes](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/67.0/releasenotes/)
- the pref is still there (default false) but so far I'm 99% sure this pref now does anything
- I will add it to the scatchpad script if this change sticks
* simplify 4500 RFP, see #1041
* update removed script
* tidy readme, see #1045
- also put readme before releases
* RIP FX Site Compat
* clean out RFP Alts info: the information is redundant: it's already in the readme
- make 1401 inactive: it affects RFP's FPing
- remove old warning/setup-web: we do not care about documenting breakage or FPing risks when we have a warning and they are inactive. If someone uses them, that's on them
- new warnings
- this was made inactive in v68
- since at least FF79, when active as false, it breaks the web and browser consoles
- it breaks websites
- it breaks extensions: e.g. uBO panel functionality
- it does nothing to mitigate possible fingerprinting (which was why it was initially added as a concern) - i.e the API only provided a standardized method, it does not stop previous/earlier workarounds
- less active prefs
- now that ESR68 is EOL, at least a whopping two (0602, 1273)
- also I don't know when the default changed - another whopping whole one (1240)
- and where we do enforce/reset a pref to default, lets say that
- this is not a definitive list, sing out if there is anything else
- IPv6 info
- especially for Iron Heart who likes to claim that this pref breaks 5% of sites
- cleanup of settings tags now we only care abut ESR78+
- adds the new tests including the non-JS JA3
Co-authored-by: rusty-snake <41237666+rusty-snake@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: earthlng <earthlng@users.noreply.github.com>
- Go to https://telemetry.mozilla.org/
- click `measurement dashboard`
- select `SSL_HANDSHAKE_VERSION`
I looked at Nightly 75 (0.26 and 0.01) and Nightly 76 (0.2 and 0)
* simplify ciphers
- let's not encourage (remove options 1, 2) changing your cipher suite FP
- remove "it's quite technical ..." (everything is technical to someone), trim to one line
- add test link so users can just see that it's FP'able
- reinforce not to fuck with the cipher suite in the cipher's sub-section
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security:Renegotiation describes
> **the new default behaviour** that was introduced in experimental mozilla-central nightly versions on 2010-02-08
where the last step is
> - should the server (or a MITM) request **renegotiation**, Mozilla will terminate the connection with an error message
and then after talking about breakage ...
> The above defaults may break some client/server environments where a Server is still using old software and requires renegotiation.
mentions workarounds to reduce said breakage:
> In order to give such environments a way to keep using Firefox (et.al.) to connect to their vulnerable server infrastructure, the following preferences are available:
specifically talking about the first 2 prefs listed there, one allowing to specify a list of hosts "where renegotiation may be performed" and the 2nd one "completely disables the new protection mechanisms".
But both those prefs were removed in FF38, meaning that since then it's no longer possible to disable the default behaviour that is "should the server (or a MITM) request **renegotiation**, Mozilla will terminate the connection with an error message".
But all of this is about the **re**-negotiation part and not negotiation. And nowhere does it say "insecure" renegotiation, which, as I read it, means that FF will terminate the connection for any kind of **renegotiation**, safe or unsafe.
1201 controls the negotiation part:
> This pref controls the behaviour during the initial negotiation between client and server.
> If set to true, a Mozilla client will reject all connection attempts to servers that are still using the old SSL/TLS protocol and which might be vulnerable to the attack.
> Setting this preference to “true” is the only way to guarantee full protection against the attack.
I think "servers that are still using the old SSL/TLS protocol" actually means servers that **only** support the old protocols.
Servers still supporting those old protocols in addition to some new protocol versions should not be affected by this pref because FF will be able to negotiate to use one of the newer protocol versions.
Ergo lets fix the title and remove the line about renegotiation support because I think that's irrelevant.
ps. the sslpulse link is nice and I'd like to keep it somewhere but it doesn't really fit in 1201 IMO so I moved it to 1202.
- split geo related vs language/locale related
- rip out intl.locale.requested
- rip out intl.regional_prefs.use_os_locales
- add intl.charset.fallback.override
Thorin-Oakenpants