Example on Raspberry Pi 4:
$ ./gocryptfs/gocryptfs -init $(mktemp -d)
Notice: Your CPU does not have AES acceleration. Consider using -xchacha for better performance.
Choose a password for protecting your files.
Password:
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/607
Commit f3c777d5ea added the `-devrandom` option:
commit f3c777d5ea
Author: @slackner
Date: Sun Nov 19 13:30:04 2017 +0100
main: Add '-devrandom' commandline option
Allows to use /dev/random for generating the master key instead of the
default Go implementation. When the kernel random generator has been
properly initialized both are considered equally secure, however:
* Versions of Go prior to 1.9 just fall back to /dev/urandom if the
getrandom() syscall would be blocking (Go Bug #19274)
* Kernel versions prior to 3.17 do not support getrandom(), and there
is no check if the random generator has been properly initialized
before reading from /dev/urandom
This is especially useful for embedded hardware with low-entroy. Please
note that generation of the master key might block indefinitely if the
kernel cannot harvest enough entropy.
We now require Go v1.13 and Kernel versions should have also moved on.
Make the flag a no-op.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/596
We used to do validation using lists of mandatory feature flags.
With the introduction of XChaCha20Poly1305, this became too
simplistic, as it uses a different IV length, hence disabling
GCMIV128.
Add a dedicated function, Validate(), with open-coded validation
logic.
The validation and creation logic also gets XChaCha20Poly1305
support, and gocryptfs -init -xchacha now writes the flag into
gocryptfs.conf.
Our git version is v2+ for some time now, but go.mod
still declared v1. Hopefully making both match makes
https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2 work.
All the import paths have been fixed like this:
find . -name \*.go | xargs sed -i s%github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/%github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/%
CheckTrailingGarbage was called even when "-passfile" was
used, which is stupid, and causes false positives:
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/391
(false error "Received trailing garbage after the password"
when using -passfile in .bash_profile)
Instead of trying to improve the logic to handle that case
and make everything even more complicated, delete the function.
It is unclear if actually helps in some cases, and it definitely
harms as shown by the above bug report.
TrezorPayload stores 32 random bytes used for unlocking
the master key using a Trezor security module. The randomness makes sure
that a unique unlock value is used for each gocryptfs filesystem.
As soon as we don't need them anymore, overwrite
keys with zeros. Make sure they run out of scope
so we don't create a risk of inadvertedly using
all-zero keys for encryption.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/211
Allows to use /dev/random for generating the master key instead of the
default Go implementation. When the kernel random generator has been
properly initialized both are considered equally secure, however:
* Versions of Go prior to 1.9 just fall back to /dev/urandom if the
getrandom() syscall would be blocking (Go Bug #19274)
* Kernel versions prior to 3.17 do not support getrandom(), and there
is no check if the random generator has been properly initialized
before reading from /dev/urandom
This is especially useful for embedded hardware with low-entroy. Please
note that generation of the master key might block indefinitely if the
kernel cannot harvest enough entropy.
This commit defines all exit codes in one place in the exitcodes
package.
Also, it adds a test to verify the exit code on incorrect
password, which is what SiriKali cares about the most.
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/77 .
As we have dropped Go 1.4 compatibility already, and will add
a new feature flag for gocryptfs v1.3 anyway, this is a good
time to enable Raw64 as well.
From the comment:
// CheckTrailingGarbage tries to read one byte from stdin and exits with a
// fatal error if the read returns any data.
// This is meant to be called after reading the password, when there is no more
// data expected. This helps to catch problems with third-party tools that
// interface with gocryptfs.
Before:
You can now mount it using: gocryptfs a x MOUNTPOINT
After:
You can now mount it using: gocryptfs "a x" MOUNTPOINT
This is still not bulletproof but should handle the common
case of having a space in the directory name. After all,
it's only a suggestion.
$ gocryptfs -init -extpass "echo test" a
Using password provided via -extpass. <<< DUPLICATE
Reading password from extpass program
The gocryptfs filesystem has been created successfully.
You can now mount it using: gocryptfs a MOUNTPOINT
