Failure was:
+ GOOS=darwin
+ GOARCH=amd64
+ go build -tags without_openssl
# github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend
internal/fusefrontend/fs_dir.go:159:60: cannot use origMode | 448 (type uint16) as type uint32 in argument to syscallcompat.Fchmodat
internal/fusefrontend/fs_dir.go:170:33: cannot use origMode (type uint16) as type uint32 in argument to syscallcompat.Fchmodat
Use openBackingDir() and Fstatat().
High performance impact, though part of it should be
mitigated by adding DirIV caching to the new code paths.
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.Eou: gocryptfs v1.6-37-ge3914b3-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-66-g6df8ddc; 2018-10-14 go1.11
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.2289 s, 213 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.02616 s, 255 MB/s
UNTAR: 24.490
MD5: 13.120
LS: 3.368
RM: 9.232
The directory was already created, so return success even if Fchownat fails.
The same error handling is already used if fs.args.PlaintextNames is false.
Even though filesystem notifications aren't implemented for FUSE, I decided to
try my hand at implementing the autounmount feature (#128). I based it on the
EncFS autounmount code, which records filesystem accesses and checks every X
seconds whether it's idled long enough to unmount.
I've tested the feature locally, but I haven't added any tests for this flag.
I also haven't worked with Go before. So please let me know if there's
anything that should be done differently.
One particular concern: I worked from the assumption that the open files table
is unique per-filesystem. If that's not true, I'll need to add an open file
count and associated lock to the Filesystem type instead.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/pull/265
Error was:
# github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:179: cannot use perms | 256 (type uint16) as type uint32 in argument to syscall.Fchmod
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:185: cannot use perms (type uint16) as type uint32 in argument to syscall.Fchmod
Rename openBackingPath to openBackingDir and use OpenDirNofollow
to be safe against symlink races. Note that openBackingDir is
not used in several important code paths like Create().
But it is used in Unlink, and the performance impact in the RM benchmark
to be acceptable:
Before
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.bYO: gocryptfs v1.6-12-g930c37e-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-49-gb11e293; 2018-09-08 go1.10.3
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.07979 s, 243 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.882413 s, 297 MB/s
UNTAR: 16.703
MD5: 7.606
LS: 1.349
RM: 3.237
After
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.jK3: gocryptfs v1.6-13-g84d6faf-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-49-gb11e293; 2018-09-08 go1.10.3
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.06261 s, 247 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.947228 s, 277 MB/s
UNTAR: 17.197
MD5: 7.540
LS: 1.364
RM: 3.410
As uncovered by xfstests generic/465, concurrent reads and writes
could lead to this,
doRead 3015532: corrupt block #1039: stupidgcm: message authentication failed,
as the read could pick up a block that has not yet been completely written -
write() is not atomic!
Now writes take ContentLock exclusively, while reads take it shared,
meaning that multiple reads can run in parallel with each other, but
not with a write.
This also simplifies the file header locking.
xfstests generic/083 fills the filesystem almost completely while
running fsstress in parallel. In fsck, these would show up:
readFileID 2580: incomplete file, got 18 instead of 19 bytes
This could happen when writing the file header works, but writing
the actual data fails.
Now we kill the header again by truncating the file to zero.
If the underlying filesystem is full, it is normal get ENOSPC here.
Log at Info level instead of Warning.
Fixes xfstests generic/015 and generic/027, which complained about
the extra output.
O_DIRECT accesses must be aligned in both offset and length. Due to our
crypto header, alignment will be off, even if userspace makes aligned
accesses. Running xfstests generic/013 on ext4 used to trigger lots of
EINVAL errors due to missing alignment. Just fall back to buffered IO.
"gocryptfs -fsck" will need access to helper functions,
and to get that, it will need to cast a gofuse.File to a
fusefrontend.File. Make fusefrontend.File exported to make
this work.
We are clean again.
Warnings were:
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:443:14: should omit type string from declaration
of var cTarget; it will be inferred from the right-hand side
internal/fusefrontend/xattr.go:26:1: comment on exported method FS.GetXAttr
should be of the form "GetXAttr ..."
internal/syscallcompat/sys_common.go:9:7: exported const PATH_MAX should have
comment or be unexported
Reading system.posix_acl_access and system.posix_acl_default
should return EOPNOTSUPP to inform user-space that we do not
support ACLs.
xftestest essientially does
chacl -l | grep "Operation not supported"
to determine if the filesystem supports ACLs, and used to
wrongly believe that gocryptfs does.
mv is unhappy when we return EPERM when it tries to set
system.posix_acl_access:
mv: preserving permissions for ‘b/x’: Operation not permitted
Now we return EOPNOTSUPP like tmpfs does and mv seems happy.
Values a binary-safe, there is no need to base64-encode them.
Old, base64-encoded values are supported transparently
on reading. Writing xattr values now always writes them binary.
We previously returned EPERM to prevent the kernel from
blacklisting our xattr support once we get an unsupported
flag, but this causes lots of trouble on MacOS:
Cannot save files from GUI apps, see
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/229
Returning ENOSYS triggers the dotfiles fallback on MacOS
and fixes the issue.
